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THE INVIOLATE HOME: HOUSING
EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Stephanie M. Stern†
The ideal of the inviolate home dominates the Fourth Amendment.
The case law accords stricter protection to residential search and
seizure than to many other privacy incursions. The focus on protection
of the physical home has decreased doctrinal efficiency and coherence
and derailed Fourth Amendment residential privacy from the core
principle of intimate association. This Article challenges Fourth
Amendment housing exceptionalism. Specifically, I critique two
hallmarks of housing exceptionalism: first, the extension of protection
to residential spaces unlikely to shelter intimate association or
implicate other key privacy interests; and second, the prohibition of
searches that impinge on core living spaces but do not harm
interpersonal and domestic privacy. Contrary to claims in the case law
and commentary, there is little evidence to support the broad territorial
conception of privacy inherent to the “sanctity of the home,” a vital
personhood interest in the physical home, or even uniformly robust
subjective privacy expectations in varying residential contexts.
Similarly, closer examination of the political and historical rationales
for housing exceptionalism reveals a nuanced, and equivocal, view of
common justifications for privileging the home. This Article advocates
replacing the broad sweep of housing exceptionalism, and its emphasis
on the physical home, with a narrower set of residential privacy
interests that are more attentive to substantive privacy and intimate
association.

INTRODUCTION
I. THE ICONIC HOME IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Fourth Amendment Search: A Home-Centric
Jurisprudence
B. The Cult of the Home: The Fourth Amendment in Cultural
Perspective
C. Allocative Costs: Protecting the Home as a Justification for
Less Privacy Protection Elsewhere
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HOUSING
EXCEPTIONALISM: REEXAMINING PRIVACY, PERSONHOOD,
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AND EXPECTATIONS

A. The Myth of Privacy as a Territorial Imperative
B. Theory Versus Evidence: The Personhood Interest in
Residential Privacy
C. An Evidence-Based Analysis of Subjective Expectations of
Privacy
III. POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL RATIONALES FOR PRIVILEGING
THE HOME
A. Political Rationales: The Dangers of Government
Overreaching
B. Originalism Revisited
IV. DETHRONING THE PHYSICAL HOME IN THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
A. From Iconic Property to Substantive Privacy
B. Revisiting the Residential Protection Default
1. Tethering Interior Search Protection to Substantive
Privacy: Kyllo and Technological Scanning of the
Home
2. Correcting Overbreadth: The Example of Curtilage
3. The Home as a Proxy: Interior Physical Searches
V. REVISING THE THEORY OF THE INVIOLATE HOME: OBJECTIONS
AND CONSIDERATIONS
A. Security and Other Privacy Interests
B. Repeat Searches and Ubiquitous Monitoring
C. Social Norms of Privacy
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The notions of the inviolate home and the paramount importance of
constraining government search of the home are cherished tenets of
constitutional law and scholarship.1 The constitutional solicitude and
judicial rhetoric surrounding the home reflects the belief that residential
privacy rights are both psychologically and politically vital.2 Assumptions
about the psychological and political primacy of residential protection have
pervaded Fourth Amendment case law and dominated criminal procedure

1 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 589–90 (1980); Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures,
and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 957 (1997) (“The
most sacred of all areas protected by the Fourth Amendment is the home.”); James Q. Whitman,
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1215 (2004)
(noting that American privacy law conceives of the home “as the primary defense”).
2 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 997–
1000 (1982) (advocating strong protection of the home from criminal searches because of
residents’ strong personhood interests); see also Arianna Kennedy Kelly, The Costs of the Fourth
Amendment: Home Searches and Takings Law, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (suggesting
compensation for harms to personhood inherent in residential searches).
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commentary without examination or challenge.3 This Article seeks to fill
that void.
Absent specified exceptions, criminal investigation of the home
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. Without a warrant,
such a search is presumptively unreasonable.4 In an era of narrowing
privacy protection,5 privacy in residential search and seizure receives
comparatively stronger protection than many other contexts, including
commercial buildings, certain automobile searches, computer databases,
and public places. Indeed, at times the protection of privacy rights in the
home has been so expansive as to appear absurd, with lawyers vigorously
contesting whether suspects’ dog houses receive Fourth Amendment
protection.6
Historically, the strong protection accorded to the home derives in part
from a property-based approach to identifying protected Fourth
Amendment interests. In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
declared that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places” and
explicitly abandoned the property-based approach in favor of a standard
that looks to reasonable expectations of privacy.7 As commentators have
observed, however, the move from property to privacy has been
incomplete, and traditional property concepts feature in some post-Katz
cases.8 I contend that the move from property to privacy has been
particularly (and perhaps paradigmatically) flawed in the area of residential
search rights. Katz may have signaled a retreat from reliance on property
law in Fourth Amendment doctrine for nonresidential property, but not for
3 The sanctity of the home in criminal law parallels the enhanced protection accorded to
the home in property, tax, and bankruptcy law. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1099–1108 (2009).
4 Activities or possessions within the home are subject to unregulated search and seizure
only when occupants expose them to the public eye or ear, in certain exigent circumstances, or
when the evidence is in plain view of a lawful intrusion. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
136–37 (1990).
5 See STEPHEN R. SADY, OFFICE OF THE FED. PUB. DEFENDER, DIST. OF OR.,
DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 1–2 (2006), http://or.fd.org/Search and
Seizure Sept 2006.pdf.
6 See Trimble v. State, 816 N.E.2d 83, 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that defendant had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area encompassing the doghouse); Bess v. State, 636
S.W.2d 9, 10 (Tex. App. 1982) (holding that warrant authorizing the search of a residence
encompassed the dog house and other outbuildings). In a similar vein, courts have scrutinized
whether privacy protections extend to discarded garbage. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 37, 40–41 (1988) (holding that search of garbage left on or at the curb did not intrude upon
reasonable expectations of privacy because the garbage was outside the protective curtilage of the
home and readily accessible to the public); see also Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125 (Wyo.
1970) (holding that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
warrantless searches when they instructed garbage collectors to give garbage to authorities for
inspection after the collectors removed it from the backyard).
7 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
8 Many scholars have discussed the property orientation of Fourth Amendment law with
Orin Kerr’s account being one of the more recent. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and
New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–
27 (2004) (discussing the persistence of property concepts in Fourth Amendment doctrine).

104

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.95:xxx

the home. This property-oriented, and specifically home-focused, approach
has produced residential protection that is at times too strong and too
blunt.9 This does not mean that residential protection is absolute; rather it
is comparatively stronger than many other search contexts and unduly
focused on the physical home. Housing exceptionalism has muddled
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to residential property and
more broadly as residential and nonresidential spaces have competed for
Fourth Amendment protection.
This Article challenges two hallmarks of housing exceptionalism.
First, privileging the physical home has adulterated Fourth Amendment
doctrine by extending the home’s expansive “umbrella” of Fourth
Amendment protection beyond the relational and domestic core of
residential spaces.10 This approach has contributed to the inefficient
allocation of privacy protection relative to both individual harm and the
societal interest in crime control. Moreover, as the rhetoric of home
protection strained criminal justice enforcement, other Fourth Amendment
doctrines, such as publicity and the plain-view seizure doctrine, moved to
the jurisprudential fore and further contorted privacy allocation.11 Second,
within core domestic and relational spaces, many cases have afforded
expansive, formalistic protection to the physical home rather than on the
basis of substantive privacy interests and intimate association. By
substantive privacy, I refer to subjective intrusiveness and objective
privacy harm from police action, not constitutional substantive due
process.12
Disturbingly, the (over)protection of the home has justified decisions
extending less protection in other contexts.13 One reason offered by courts
for extending less protection to privacy in nonresidential contexts is their
9 In United States v. Kyllo, 553 U.S. 27 (2001), the majority described the shift in search
and seizure doctrine from the common law of trespass of property to the reasonable expectations
of privacy test, but the majority also noted that in the case of the home “there is a ready criterion,
with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is
acknowledged to be reasonable.” Id. at 34 (emphasis added and omitted); see also William C.
Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 633, 637 (1994)
(noting that “the Fourth Amendment offers independent protection for property interests, apart
from privacy interests”).
10 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (describing the home’s “umbrella”
of Fourth Amendment protection).
11 Christopher Slobogin describes how this dynamic interacts with the probable cause
standard in general. He observes that the probable cause standard “exerts enormous pressure on
the courts to reduce the scope of the Fourth Amendment by narrowly defining ‘search’ and
‘seizure.’” CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK 29 (2007).
12 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (holding that “[i]n the home, . . . all details are intimate
details”); Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300, 303 (broadly defining intimate activities to include “domestic
life” and holding that an area is protected curtilage if it “harbors the intimate activity associated
with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986) (“We find it
important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy
expectations are most heightened.”); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1985) (holding
that the expectations of privacy are with regard to homes rather than automobiles).
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dissimilarity to residential privacy interests. In this way, residential search
doctrine has indirectly facilitated precedents that limit protection in the
more prevalent search contexts of vehicular search, stop and frisk, and
public surveillance.14 This dynamic belies the popular intuition that
protection for the home secures and fosters privacy protection as a general
matter.
Despite these costs, housing exceptionalism has thrived on the
assumption that Fourth Amendment protection of the physical home
effectively safeguards critical personal and political interests.15
Psychological and historical evidence reveal a more complex and equivocal
picture. With respect to the psychological claims, there is little objective
evidence that privacy is primarily a spatial or territorial concept or that
individuals require the utmost protection from residential privacy
incursions. The empirical evidence also does not support strict protection
of the physical home based on a personhood interest or the assumption that
the home’s inviolacy is vital to identity and psychological flourishing.
Even subjective expectations of privacy suggest a relative view of home
privacy and call into question the privileging of all things residential.
Citizens ascribe much greater intrusiveness to searches of bedrooms, for
example, than searches of home garages, curbside residential garbage, or
surveillance of backyards.16
The political and historical necessity of housing exceptionalism also
falters upon closer examination. The claim that homes are uniquely
vulnerable to police harassment and overreaching because they contain so
much potential evidence is unconvincing—overreaching is a more
troubling issue in computer and database searches than in residential ones.17
Moreover, the way to protect against police overreaching in residential
search is not through housing exceptionalism but by undoing or limiting the
plain-view seizure doctrine. Contrary to constitutional intuition, residential
search protection does not provide citizens an effective haven from the
reach of government. Because enhanced protection of residential privacy
rights has justified less protection, jurisprudentially and politically, in more
prevalent contexts of search and seizure, housing exceptionalism has
14 See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1062 & n.169 (1995).
15 See infra Part II.
16 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 738 tbl.1 (1993); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal et
al., The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 331, 355 tbl.1 (2009).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir.
2009) (en banc) (stating that magistrate judges should insist that the government waive reliance
on the plain view doctrine when granting warrants to search computer hard drives or electronic
storage); see also Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 319 (2008) (discussing various data-mining activities by federal
agencies).
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tended to increase government’s reach. Within residential search, the
doctrinal emphasis on the physical home (and privacy versus publicity) has
diverted judicial attention from substantive privacy harm and left gaps in
residential search protection. Even the rationale of original intent, a
constant in the Supreme Court’s holdings, is subject to challenge. The
historical record reveals a more complex view of the intentions of the
Framers than the Court depicts. In addition, as Tracey Maclin and other
scholars observe, the concerns of those who lived in 1791 should not
determine the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for our modern criminal
justice system.18
The iconic status of the home in American culture offers a lens
through which to view the persistent privileging of the home in Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The cultural ascendancy of the American home
dates back at least to the Romantic philosophy of the home as a refuge
from urban corruption. The New Deal subsequently marketed this vision
of the home as a civic virtue and the centerpiece of Depression-era reform.
The long-standing cultural dominance of the home—not a territorial zone
of privacy interests, the home’s special personhood nature, or the home as a
haven against government—is a factor in housing exceptionalism’s
persistence. This cultural wellspring has produced laws privileging the
home in multiple areas of law, including the Fourth Amendment.
This Article seeks to disentangle the concepts of residential property
and privacy and to identify the substantive interests at stake in different
contexts of residential search. A substantive privacy inquiry addresses the
degree of intrusiveness and objective harm of the privacy invasion rather
than property rights or residential boundaries. In particular, I focus on the
substantive interest in intimate association and argue that it is a dominant—
but not exclusive—interest in residential search. In my view, this interest
derives from the Fourth Amendment and specifically from the holding in
Katz that the Fourth Amendment safeguards expectations of privacy in
order to protect “people, not places.”19
This approach to residential search seeks to unseat the icon of the
physical home and replace it with a jurisprudence that is more responsive
to the concerns of substantive privacy that animate residential settings.
Some residential search contexts that presently receive protection are not
likely to implicate substantial privacy harm. For example, searches of
certain areas adjacent to the home that are not used for domestic life and do
18 See Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 971 (2002); see also WILLIAM J.
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING, 602–1791, at 772
(2009) (suggesting that the Framers could not “anticipat[e] the constitutional issues of later
centuries”); LARRY YACKLE, REGULATORY RIGHTS: SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, AND THE MAKING OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (2007) (arguing for instrumentalism in
interpreting the Constitution as opposed to the “pretense that the 1789 document and its
amendments actually supply answers to difficult questions”).
19 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (emphasis added).
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not impair the underlying interest in intimate association are likely to have
a minimal impact on substantive privacy. Similarly, technological scans
that reveal only physical information such as heat and light merit less
stringent protection than technology that risks chilling interaction and
authenticity by exposing inhabitants’ interpersonal activities and private
actions. This analysis simplifies the seemingly controversial issue of
government thermal scanning of homes addressed in the landmark case of
Kyllo v. United States and suggests a lower standard of protection.20
Before proceeding, I offer a few clarifications. First, my arguments
focus on the constitutional understanding of privacy—the focus of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence for the past half century. I do not consider at
length alternative grounds for protection, such as the rather vaguely
conceptualized security interest in the Fourth Amendment21 or the risks of
property destruction and violence attendant to residential search. To the
extent that psychological and political rationales are the operative
justifications for privileging the physical home, I advocate reorienting the
doctrinal focus from housing exceptionalism to substantive privacy and
privacy of intimate association.
Second, my discussion primarily
contemplates discrete instances of residential search,22 although I do
consider institutional checks and legal safeguards for repeat searches. Last,
my focus is on housing exceptionalism and the relative protection of
privacy rights in residential spaces. Scholars debate whether Fourth
Amendment protection should depend on the Katz test and the probable
cause requirement for search or a sliding scale based on the strength of the
government justification relative to the intrusiveness of the search.23 In
light of these issues, I do not specify comprehensive, detailed standards for
residential search. Instead, I argue more generally that a residential
investigation that does not harm interpersonal interests or other key privacy

20

533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104–05 (2008)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment should protect security, not privacy, because the right to
privacy does not address two central concerns of the Fourth Amendment: protection from
government invasion and protection of liberty).
22 In the contexts of stop-and-frisk searches and vehicular stops, individual citizens who are
subjected to a large number of intrusive searches are at a greater risk of psychological harm due
to the ongoing loss of control and the inference that these practices signal a lack of societal
respect toward them. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23–24 (2003) (exploring the notion of disrespect as the cause of anger in
minority communities over search and seizure practices).
23 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 21–45. Scholars also disagree about the amount of
practical protection that warrants provide. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable
Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s Principled Protection of Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575,
589–93 (2008) (arguing that institutional competence, lack of resources, inadequate records of the
probable cause finding, and lack of appellate review of probable cause findings undermine the
protection that warrants provide); Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models:
Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1024–25 (1974)
(observing that judges in warrant proceedings rely too heavily on counsel to raise issues and lack
adequate administrative staff and resources).
21
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interests may not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, or if it is a Fourth
Amendment search, may not necessitate the high standard of probable
cause.
Part I of this Article explores the enshrinement of the physical home
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, often at the expense of substantive
privacy and doctrinal efficiency. Part II assesses the psychological
evidence bearing on major rationales for privileging the physical home: the
understanding of privacy as spatial exclusion, the personhood interest in the
home, and subjective expectations of privacy. Moving to political and
constitutional justifications, Part III analyzes the claim that residential
searches are uniquely vulnerable to government overreaching and critiques
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of original intent. Part IV advocates
replacing housing exceptionalism with a stronger, more consistent doctrinal
focus on substantive privacy and privacy of intimate association. I
describe, through illustrative examples, how a substantive-privacy
approach can address some of the pitfalls of housing exceptionalism. Part
V addresses objections to my account and considerations for revising the
Fourth Amendment doctrine of residential privacy.
I
THE ICONIC HOME IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Homes have achieved iconic status in the modern Fourth Amendment,
with judicial rhetoric elevating residential search to the apex of protection.
Doctrinally, homes receive greater protection than many contexts of search
and seizure; only a few contexts, such as telephone booths and bodily
invasion, receive greater protection.24 Courts and commentators justify
stringent and expansive protection of the physical home based on the
psychological primacy of privacy in the home and the home’s political and
historical role as a haven from the reach of government.25 From the
perspective of a cultural historian or property scholar, however, this
persistent reverence is part of a broader cultural ascendance of the home
across the last century—an ascendance that governmental actors and
private business interests largely engineered. The perseverance of this
“cult of the home” in criminal search doctrine and rhetoric has inflicted
significant damage on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It has created an
inefficient and anomalous pattern of protection within residential spaces
and between residential spaces and other search contexts. It has also
justified, both politically and jurisprudentially, reducing protection in other
search contexts.

24 See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766–67 (1985) (intrusion into the body); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967) (telephone booth); see also Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006).
25 See infra Part I.A.
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A. Fourth Amendment Search: A Home-Centric Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has defended the home as a sacred site at the
“core of the Fourth Amendment.”26 Police may not physically intrude on a
home, seize property within the home, or arrest a suspect in her home
without a warrant.27 The warrant must issue based on a showing of
probable cause and satisfy other procedural requirements or risk exclusion
of the evidence at trial.28 In a jurisprudence focused on privacy versus
publicity, the home is the quintessential private space.29 Indeed, the
Court’s rhetoric (if not invariably its decisions) characterizes the “physical
entry of the home [as] the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed.”30
Absent a specified exception,
warrantless physical invasion of the home “by even a fraction of an inch” is
constitutionally impermissible.31 A long line of Supreme Court precedent
has proclaimed the sanctity of the home and its inviolability in language
underscoring the home’s connotation with sacredness and religiosity.32
26 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999). Scholars agree that the home site is
jurisprudentially sacred. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 1, at 957 (“The most sacred of all areas
protected by the Fourth Amendment is the home.”); Kelly, supra note 2, at 7–8 (noting that the
home has become the “gold standard” for Fourth Amendment protection).
27 See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 257, 257–59 (1984).
28 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary
rule); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.1 (4th ed. 2004) (describing the origins and purposes of the exclusionary rule).
29 Cf. Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 LAW & LITERATURE 291, 299–309 (2008)
(discussing the tension in law regarding the crossing of public and private in the home).
30 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
31 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). Residential protection in Fourth Amendment law has addressed not only
traditional dwellings but also temporary dwellings, such as hotels and boarding places, and some
nontraditional residences, such as long-term hospital rooms. See, e.g., United States v. Gooch, 6
F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1993) (“We have already established that a person can have an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in a tent on private property.”); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d
1318, 1331–32 (9th Cir. 1985) (permitting legitimate law enforcement practices in a “migrant
worker farm housing community” but holding that farm checks violate the Fourth Amendment).
In Fourteenth Amendment cases, the protective shield of the home has extended so far as to
legalize conduct within the privacy of the home that would otherwise be unlawful. See Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that a state statute criminalizing private possession of
obscene materials may not “reach into the privacy of one’s own home”). At the state level, the
Alaska Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to the personal consumption of
marijuana in the home based on a right to privacy. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 503–04
(Alaska 1975).
32 See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (holding that warrantless searches
and seizures inside a home are “presumptively unreasonable” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 586 (1980))); Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house . . . [and] that threshold may not reasonably be
crossed without a warrant.” (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 590)); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 714 (1984) (“[P]rivate residences are places in which the individual normally expects
privacy . . . and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable.”); United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 316 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting)
(discussing inviolability of residential interiors). As Linda McClain observes, the Court quite
deliberately chose the word sacred, with its connotations of religiosity and inviolability, to
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Not only has the Court rhetorically “drawn a firm line at the entrance
to the house,”33 it has expansively defined the “home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth
Amendment protection” to include outdoor curtilage and on occasion
garages and garbage.34 The expansive reach of the home beyond core
living spaces is one hallmark of Fourth Amendment housing
exceptionalism.35 Curtilage is the outdoor property surrounding the home.
It receives protection from physical entry and search (subject to some
significant exceptions).36 Only at a remove from the home, in open fields,
woods, or water, is the residence subject to police search without a
warrant.37
In the legal literature, criminal procedure scholars and privacy
theorists almost invariably support stringent and expansive protection of
the home. Even the most ardent advocates of limiting privacy stop their
assault at the threshold of the home and argue that residential privacy
protection shelters actions that are legitimately exempt from government
encroachment.38
The dominant assumption in criminal procedure
scholarship seems to be that the home, and privacy within the home, is
psychologically and politically important to individuals in a way, or to a
degree, that privacy in other contexts is not.39 Recent work has gone so far
as to consider whether Fourth Amendment home searches should be
subject to a compensation requirement analogous to a government taking.40
The draw of the home for courts and commentators—and of a
formalistic, property-based approach to home protection—appears
describe the home in constitutional jurisprudence. Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy:
The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 202–06, 232–41 (1995).
33 Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (describing a four-factor test
to determine if an area is within the home’s protected area); United States v. Whaley, 781 F.2d
417, 420–21 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that entering residential property and seizing marijuana
plants growing adjacent to the house violates the Fourth Amendment).
35 Courts do not, however, appear reluctant to deem an area an open field rather than
curtilage. This trend responds, as I shall discuss in Part IV, to an implicit recognition of the costs
of the curtilage exception and the limited privacy interest in outdoor spaces.
36 See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 (discussing the development of the curtilage exception). A
significant exception to curtilage protection is that the Court has allowed aerial surveillance of
backyards so long as the airspace is generally accessible to the public. See California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986).
37 See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
38 See e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 196 (1999) (“[C]ontemporary
American society largely exempts from scrutiny most acts that occur inside the home . . . .”).
39 James Whitman observes that Americans, unlike Europeans, “tend[] to imagine the home
as the primary defense, and the state as the primary enemy.” Whitman, supra note 1, at 1215; see
also Radin, supra note 2, at 992 (“There is . . . the feeling that it would be an insult for the state to
invade one’s home because it is the scene of one’s history and future, one’s life and growth.”). In
some instances, there appears to be an unspoken sentiment that privacy protection should be
employed to mitigate the harshness or discriminatory character of substantive criminal law.
While I am sympathetic to these concerns, utilizing privacy and search law as a safety valve for
the criminal justice system not only detracts from an efficient and coherent body of privacy law
but also diffuses the political will necessary for independent reform of criminal law.
40 See Kelly, supra note 2, at 35.
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ineluctable.41 In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
declared that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”42 Prior
to Katz, the Court premised search protection on property law concepts and
employed the common law of trespass to discern when searches violated
constitutionally protected areas.43 The test articulated in Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion in Katz is that government action rises to the level of a
search when the person has “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”
and “society is prepared to recognize [that expectation] as ‘reasonable.’”44
As Katz and subsequent cases made clear, however, the expulsion of
property from the province of Fourth Amendment protection was not
complete.45 Reverence for the physical home tethered the Court to the
property principles it had strived to abandon. Lower courts heeded Justice
Harlan’s explanation that determining reasonable expectations of privacy
“requires reference to a ‘place,’” and in the case of the residential property,
“a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy.”46
A year later, the Court clarified the continuing dominance of the home by
holding that Katz “was [not] intended to withdraw any of the protection
which the Amendment extends to the home.”47
In the 2001 landmark case of Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme
Court further strengthened Fourth Amendment protection of the home.48
Kyllo held unconstitutional a warrantless thermal scan of a home conducted
from a public street, which indicated probable cause to suspect a
marijuana-growing operation.49 The thermal scan recorded relative heat
patterns and did not reveal other details of the occupants’ interactions or

41 See Kerr, supra note 8, at 814–27 (describing the property-based component of the
Fourth Amendment).
42 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
43 See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–36 (1942) (“We hold that what
was heard by the use of the detectaphone was not made illegal by trespass or unlawful entry.”);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464–66 (1928) (holding that a search does not violate
an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights unless “there has been a search or seizure of his person,
or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of
his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure”).
44 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45 Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of
the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889, 894 (2004)
(“There has long been significant overlap between property rights and reasonable expectations of
privacy. Privacy is one of the things that people value about private property.”).
46 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d
1506, 1518 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Reed, 733 F.2d 492, 500–01 (8th Cir. 1984).
47 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969). Subsequent cases, including those
addressing warrantless arrest within the doorway of the suspect’s residence, affirmed the home as
a dividing line between constitutional and unconstitutional police conduct. See Kelly, supra note
2, at 9 (“[The] seemingly magical quality of a home to confer immunity from warrantless arrest to
a person as soon as he is inside does not seem to accord with Katz’s claim that the protections of
the Fourth Amendment are for people rather than places.”).
48 533 U.S. 27, 37, 40 (2001).
49 See id. at 29–30, 40.

112

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.95:xxx

interpersonal activities.50 Drawing on the text and historical understanding
of Fourth Amendment protection, Justice Antonin Scalia defended the
interior of the home as the “prototypical . . . area of protected privacy.”51
The majority opinion did, however, leave a substantial loophole that may
ultimately erode home protection: it limited its holding to technology “not
in general public use.”52 The dissenters recognized the constitutional
preeminence of the home but disagreed with the majority because the
thermal scan did not penetrate the interior of the home and only measured
its exterior—an interest they thought paled against “‘the chief evil against
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed,’ the ‘physical
entry of the home.’”53
The Kyllo case highlights another hallmark of housing exceptionalism:
the reflexive protection of the home interior as a vital form of property or
an all-encompassing symbol of domestic life.54 By virtue of their locus
within the home, “all details are intimate details” no matter how mundane
or technical.55 In Kyllo, and in a number of other Fourth Amendment
precedents, intimacy derives from the residential status of property, not
from a particularized analysis of the ex ante likelihood that a type of search
will implicate substantive interests.56
To be clear, home protection is not absolute and there are chinks in the
doctrinal armor. Housing exceptionalism describes the comparatively
robust (and property-focused) protection of the home and the rhetoric
surrounding residential intrusion; it does not presume total protection.
Fourth Amendment residential search doctrine encompasses a variety of
exceptions in tension with the Court’s protectionist rhetoric. Many of these
exceptions derive from property law and reveal the double-edged sword of
housing exceptionalism’s property orientation. For example, trespass has

50

See id. at 29–30.
Id. at 34.
52 Id. at 34; see also Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth
Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 1393, 1413–14 (2002) (discussing the difficulties lower courts will face when applying the
“not in general use” standard).
53 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41–42, 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist.
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
54 For a general overview of the problems of Fourth Amendment formalism, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759–61 (1994).
55 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (emphasis omitted); see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 512 (1961).
56 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (“[T]he
centrally relevant consideration [to the curtilage determination is] whether the area in question is
so intimately tied to the home itself . . . .”). Fourth Amendment case law contrasts starkly with
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in its ready recognition and consistent application of the
principle that “the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property
rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty:
The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2009) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, rather than protecting intimate relationships, creates vulnerability).
51
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influenced Fourth Amendment doctrines that permit undercover agents to
acquire evidence from conversations or other activities in the defendant’s
domicile and empower third-party cohabitants to consent to a residential
search.57 Squatting on another’s property may nullify a person’s privacy
rights.58 Other exceptions are based on safety, such as allowing protective
sweeps of the home following arrest.59 The exception with the greatest
impact, the plain-view seizure doctrine, enables the police to seize evidence
when police observe the evidence without assistance from a place where
they have a right to be, and they have probable cause to believe that the
object is the fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of the crime.60
Even with these doctrinal exceptions, homes receive comparatively
stronger protection than, for example, searches of commercial buildings,
certain automobile searches, computer databases and in some instances the
internet, and public places. The exceptions illustrate how the Court’s
property focus and absolutist rhetoric creates internal inefficiency within
residential search doctrine: formalistic protection breeds formalistic
exceptions. It may be the case that residential search doctrine has buckled
under the force of its rhetoric and the steep costs to law enforcement of
taking precedents strictly at their word. In addition, the extreme
protectionist language in many cases, coupled with other precedents
carving out exceptions, increases decisional variance. When deciding
novel questions, the Court may extend the reach of exceptions, or, as in the
Kyllo case, it may apply the sanctity of the home rhetoric to uphold strong
residential protection.

57 See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (holding that warrantless entry to
search for drug evidence did not violate the Constitution even though the police reasonably but
erroneously believed that the consenting third party possessed common authority over the
premises); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that defendant had no
protected Fourth Amendment interest in information he voluntarily confided to a police informer
while in the defendant’s hotel room).
58 See Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1975) (“The [squatting]
plaintiffs knew they had no colorable claim to occupy the land . . . . That fact alone makes
ludicrous any claim that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). As another example,
housing inspections are permissible subject to a warrant based on satisfaction of reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for local inspection, not traditional probable cause. See
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (holding that probable cause to issue a warrant
to inspect property for housing code violations “must exist if reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied”).
59 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that a properly limited sweep
incident to a lawful in-home arrest is permissible when police possess a reasonable belief based
on specific and articulable facts that area harbors an individual posing danger).
60 See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738–40 (1983) (establishing plain view doctrine in
context of vehicular search); cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
501, 507 (2007) (“[I]t is the home that seems to be the one place where the Court claims to be,
and often is, granting privacy without requiring extraordinary efforts to see that what is said and
done in the home stays in the home.”).
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B. The Cult of the Home: The Fourth Amendment in Cultural
Perspective
The cultural and legal ascendance of the home across the twentieth
century has encouraged the persistence of housing exceptionalism.
Specifically, both the historical construction of the home as a sacred
domestic sphere and the iconic cultural status of the home today have
influenced constitutional doctrine. This influence does not explain the
genesis of Fourth Amendment residential protection in the Framing Era,
but it is a factor (although not the exclusive one) in the persistence of
doctrines privileging the physical home.61 In turn, constitutional and
statutory laws have reinforced norms regarding the preeminent importance
of the residential home to its occupants and to society.62
The cultural dominance of the home dates to the late nineteenthcentury Romantic characterization of the home as a refuge from the
corruption and danger of urban life. Social historians have described how
industrialization recreated the home as a “private place.”63 As early as
1880, Vermont recognized a property right of residential “quiet occupancy
and privacy.”64 Writing in 1896, Missouri Attorney General Herbert
Spencer Hadley identified the “sanctity of the home” as well as the
protection of private reputation as the key concerns of privacy.65 During
this time, the American press and influential commentators, including
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, began to regularly cite the British
maxim of “home as castle.”66
61 Other scholars have argued that Fourth Amendment protection derives from an
inside/outside distinction with interior spaces protected at the expense of exteriors. For an
application of this theory to the internet, see Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the
Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 22–25),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348322.
62 From this perspective, criminal law is unique not in its overattentiveness to the home—
that solicitousness is also a principal feature of property law, for example—but in the fact that it
(rightly) does not differentiate protection on the basis of ownership versus rental or short-term
occupancy. See id.
63 See Tamera K. Hareven, The Home and Family in Historical Perspective, 58 SOC. RES.
253, 259 (1991) (“Following the removal of the workplace from the home as a result of
urbanization and industrialization, the household was recast as the family’s private retreat, and
home emerged as a new concept and existence.”).
64 See Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of
the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 632–33 n.59 (2002) (citing Newell v. Witcher, 53 Vt.
589, 591 (1880)).
65 See H.S. Hadley, Can the Publication of a Libel Be Enjoined?, 4 NW. L. REV. 137, 145
(1896). Contemporaneously, journalists began to compare searches of homes to searches of the
mail and telegraphs, a major privacy consternation of the nineteenth century. See Telegrams in
Court, N.Y. TRIB., Jan. 8, 1877, at 4; Trials of the Census-Taker, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1875, at 4.
With respect to government search, Judge Thomas Cooley observed that “[the] maxim that ‘every
man’s house is his castle’ is made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures.”
THOMAS M. COOLEY, 1 A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 611 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927) (internal footnote omitted).
66 See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 220 (1890) (“The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle . . . .”);
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In the first half of the twentieth century, the reverence for the home
only intensified with the New Deal, which cast homes and homeownership
as civic virtues.67 Government policy made housing the linchpin of
Depression-era economic reform. Profit-savvy financial and banking
special interest groups were quick to respond.68 The marketing of the home
as a powerful symbol, coupled with financial incentives, channeled wealth
investment to residential real estate and solidified the cultural icon of the
residential home.69
The cultural status of the home provides a new perspective on the
persistence of expansive protection and absolutist rhetoric in Fourth
Amendment residential search. The modern-day judicial sentiment that all
details within the home are intimate details is eerily reminiscent of the
Romantic ideal of the home as an idealized and encapsulated private
domestic sphere in which to retreat from modern life. Without claiming
exclusive causation, the history of the domicile as a culturally supercharged
property suggests one motivation for the maintenance of property concepts
in residential search doctrine long after the Court disavowed this approach.
Not only does the law reflect the cultural centrality of the home, it also
entrenches and intensifies the home’s normative significance. Laws
protecting privacy influence what people view as private. In light of the
circularity between law and norms, the determination of the objective
reasonableness of subjective expectations, which Katz requires, should not
be solely majoritarian (i.e., what most people in society would deem
private).70 Taking a strictly majoritarian view of privacy, without
considering objective harm, creates a feedback loop that cements the iconic
status of the home (and biases against minority interests and emerging
technologies).
C. Allocative Costs: Protecting the Home as a Justification for Less
Privacy Protection Elsewhere
Judicial doctrine and rhetoric constructing the home as a

M.J. Savage, A Profane View of the Sanctum, 141 N. AM. REV. 137, 146–47 (1885) (“An
Englishman’s house is his castle.” (quotation marks omitted)).
67 See Ronald Tobey et al., Moving Out and Settling In: Residential Mobility, Home
Owning, and the Public Enframing of Citizenship, 1921–1950, 95 AM. HIST. REV. 1395, 1413–19
(1990).
68 See id.
69 See Alan Zundel, Policy Frames and Ethical Traditions: The Case of Homeownership for
the Poor, 23 POL’Y STUD. J. 423, 426–28 (1995) (describing effect of the federal “Own Your
Own Home” campaign and New Deal–era legislation on the ideology of homeownership).
70 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988) (“An expectation of
privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, however, unless society is prepared
to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable.”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177
(1984) (“The Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only
those expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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psychological and political fortress have created a strikingly inconsistent,
and at times bizarre, pattern of privacy protection.71 The privileging of the
physical home has stymied the efficient allocation of privacy by according
too much protection to residential property and physical structures (and
then undoing a share of that protection through exceptions based on
property concepts or publicity, rather than privacy and crime control
needs). Privacy interests must be prioritized and balanced against other
societal needs, such as safety, crime control, and judicial and governmental
resources.72
The current patchwork of Fourth Amendment search
protection does not strike an appropriate balance: in its permutations in
various
search
contexts—residence,
curtilage,
garbage,
and
nonresidential—it overprotects and underprotects with respect to
intrusiveness and harm.73 Perhaps courts and commentators implicitly
recognize that in balancing societal interests in crime control versus
privacy there is not unlimited privacy protection to go around.74 Rather
than allocating privacy on the basis of intrusiveness, objective harm, and
societal interests, however, courts have typically opted to allocate based on
context or publicity.75
This inefficiency extends beyond residential search: strong protection
for the home often means less protection for other types of search. This
relationship contradicts common intuitions in criminal procedure. Many
scholars are keen proponents of strong privacy laws and worry about
narrowing Fourth Amendment protection in the past half century.76 If more

71 For example, while curtilage receives probable cause protection, strip searches in schools
are subject to the lower standard of reasonable suspicion. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009) (holding that school officials did not have reasonable
suspicion to strip search thirteen-year-old girl based only on another student claiming to have
received ibuprofen from her).
72 Kerr, supra note 8, passim (discussing privacy interests and the proper manner to regulate
the use of new technologies for criminal investigations); see also ETZIONI, supra note 38, at 9
(“[P]rivacy often is privileged over the common good . . . .”).
73 Chris Slobogin has argued that the “probable cause forever” approach to the Fourth
Amendment is a significant cause of this problem. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 28–30; see
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (no Fourth Amendment protection for the
phone numbers that residents dial); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437–40 (1976) (no
warrant requirement to obtain bank records).
74 See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 31 (1997) (“It is clear . . . that
neither privacy values nor costs are absolute.”); see also Kenneth Einar Himma, Privacy Versus
Security: Why Privacy Is Not an Absolute Value or Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 866 (2007)
(“[I]nformational privacy rights are below security rights in the moral hierarchy.”); cf. AVISHAI
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 201 (1996) (“The institutions in a decent society must not
encroach upon personal privacy.”).
75 For example, the curtilage doctrine has motivated artificial and nonsensical approaches to
publicity to undo the damage that housing exceptionalism creates. The Fourth Amendment does
not protect curtilage from aerial surveillance based on the questionable reasoning that commercial
flights routinely enter the airspace above the curtilage. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213–15 (1986). Similarly, driveways lose protection because they are susceptible to public
trespass. See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1194–95 (10th Cir. 2003).
76 See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 60, at 514–16.
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privacy is a good thing,77 the argument goes, then constitutional solicitude
for the home is also a good thing because it affords protection in an age of
shrinking privacy.
A review of the Fourth Amendment case law reveals that the home
does not serve as a bastion of privacy protection that secures privacy in
other contexts. Rather, courts frequently employ the constitutional status
of the home to justify more limited protection in contexts outside of the
home. For example, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that aerial surveillance of a commercial plant was not subject to
Fourth Amendment protection because the plant complex was not
analogous to the “‘curtilage’ of a dwelling” and because, unlike
homeowners, businesses do not have an interest in being free from
inspection.78 The Court suggested that it would have extended protection if
the complex had been a residence, “where privacy expectations are most
heightened.”79 In California v. Carney, the Court wrote that, in addition to
the consideration of mobility, “‘less rigorous warrant requirements govern
because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is
significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.’ . . . These
reduced expectations of privacy derive . . . from the pervasive regulation of
vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.”80 In a similar vein,
recent scholarship charges that technological searches and restraints, such
as biometric scanners and DNA collection, do not receive protection
because they “do not take the form of physical intrusions on sacred
spaces.”81 I do not claim that residential search precedents are the sole
reason these contexts receive less protection; rather the case law illustrates
how home-search cases provide additional justification for limiting
protection outside of the home.
This dynamic is particularly worrisome in light of the evidence that
privileging residential privacy may result in less net privacy protection
because most search activity is nonresidential. William Stuntz observes
that “there are many, many more street encounters than searches of private
homes” and that “protecting privacy in the home casts a smaller substantive
shadow than protecting privacy in glove compartments or jacket pockets.”82
The symbolic stronghold of the home, which looms so large in American
consciousness, diverts both public and judicial concern from other privacy
interests. Social scientists have described how basing legal or social
77 See United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting the
importance of privacy to a free and open society).
78 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986). In general, commercial property is also subject to a lower
standard of reasonableness when it is also subject to regulation and privacy-dissolving civil
inspection. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
79 Dow, 476 U.S. at 237 n.4.
80 471 U.S. 386, 390–92 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68
(1976)).
81 Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1359 (2008).
82 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1061–62.
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consequences on whether an action has occurred inside or outside of a
protected territory makes the “territory appear[] as the agent doing the
controlling.”83 Of course, removing protection from residential spaces does
not guarantee that protections will accrue to important, nonresidential
interests. However, reconceiving residential privacy rights and the Fourth
Amendment as safeguarding vital interests and addressing substantive
privacy harms can prompt such reform.
To the extent that public and private spaces compete for protection,
there are also distributional consequences to the dominance of the home in
Fourth Amendment search. Low-income individuals spend a greater share
of their time in public venues and socialize more frequently in public
spaces, which typically receive less protection under the Fourth
Amendment. In addition, tying search protection to the physical home has
made residents of nonaffixed mobile motor homes subject to warrantless
search and seizure and created uncertainty as to whether the homeless
receive protection in their public and transient living spaces.84
II
PSYCHOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR HOUSING EXCEPTIONALISM:
REEXAMINING PRIVACY, PERSONHOOD, AND EXPECTATIONS
Courts and commentators justify the expansive protection of the
home, often to the neglect of substantive privacy, on the view that the
physical home and “home territory” are psychologically unique and vital to
its occupants. These accounts focus on the importance—or even the
necessity—of strong search protection for residential property.85 Much
case law and commentary presumes a potent territorial interest in the
protection of the physical home and that the Fourth Amendment safeguards
the “personhood” property of the domicile.86 The accepted wisdom is that
stringent and expansive residential search protection, focused on the
housing structure and property concepts, accords with citizens’ subjective
expectations of privacy. This Part considers each of these rationales in turn
and contends that the evidence belies the psychological exigency that
courts and commentators attribute to the Fourth Amendment home.
A. The Myth of Privacy as a Territorial Imperative
Fourth Amendment doctrine implicates a distinctly spatial and
83

ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: IT’S THEORY AND HISTORY 33 (1986).
See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392–94; David H. Steinberg, Constructing Homes for the
Homeless? Searching for a Fourth Amendment Standard, 41 DUKE L.J. 1508, 1536–40 (1992)
(describing the Connecticut state court case of State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991),
which considered the search of a homeless man living under a bridge underpass but ultimately
extended protection on other grounds); cf. United States v. Fultz, 146 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that homeless man had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed container
that he stored with permission in another person’s garage).
85 See supra notes 26–56 and accompanying text.
86 See Radin, supra note 2, at 1013; see also Kelly, supra note 2, at 28.
84
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territorial conception of residential privacy—a conception that is at odds
with the psychological research and privacy literature.
A key
jurisprudential justification for privileging the physical home is the
formulation of privacy as exclusionary control over vital physical spaces—
the “sanctity of the home.”87 The Supreme Court has held that nowhere is
the “zone of privacy” more clearly defined “than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home.”88 The
research literature belies this account and indicates that privacy is primarily
psychological and relational, not territorial.
If privacy depended upon control of space, and specifically of homes,
stable and robust privacy norms would persist with respect to residential
spaces. Instead, the research reveals that individuals adapt their privacy
norms to their environments.89 Expectations of residential privacy vary
widely among cultures.90 Poorer individuals tend to expect and demand
less privacy.91 Psychological and developmental studies indicate that
people are socialized to identify certain areas as private and that these areas
may change based on subsequent experiences.92 In addition, privacy
regulation “can serve the important social function[] of allowing checks on
compliance with norms.”93
Contrary to the claims of some commentators, there is no evidence
that residential privacy reflects an innate, biological drive to defend against
territorial intrusion.94 Humans are evolutionarily social beings, and the
87 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588 (1980) (illustrating the jurisprudential
construction of the home as a protected “territory” at the core of the Fourth Amendment).
88 See id. at 589.
89 See Peter Kelvin, A Social-Psychological Examination of Privacy, 12 BRIT. J. SOC. &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 248, 256 (1973) (“[A]reas of privacy, being a function of norms, may
change—they are not immutable.”). Similarly, Amitai Etzioni observes, “Although some vague
notion of privacy exists in most, if not all, societies, the specific way we treat privacy in our law
and culture is a recent phenomenon . . . . [P]rivacy is hardly a near-sacred concept that cannot be
reformulated.” ETZIONI, supra note 38, at 188 (internal footnote omitted).
90 For example, tribal communities in Brazil live in communal housing, and the Javanese,
whose dwellings frequently lack doors, freely enter and wander within others’ private homes.
Irwin Altman, Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific?, 33 J. SOC.
ISSUES 66, 72–74 (1977); see also SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS
OF DISCLOSURE 24 (2002) (“[C]ultures may vary in the degree to which privacy plays a role in
social life.”).
91 See Alexander Kira, Privacy and the Bathroom, in ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY:
MAN AND HIS PHYSICAL SETTING 269, 274–75 (Harold M. Proshansky et al. eds., 1970) (finding
that lower socioeconomic status results in more crowded living conditions that relax privacy
norms); Robert S. Laufer & Maxine Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A
Multidimensional Developmental Theory, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 22, 29 (1977) (reporting that children
and adolescents cited the bathroom as a private place only in families with few members or a low
occupant-per-room ratio); Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of Privacy, 73 AM. J. SOC.
741, 743 (1968) (“Privacy has always been a luxury.”).
92 See Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 91, at 29.
93 See Stephen T. Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of Westin’s and Altman’s
Theories of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 411, 416 (2003).
94 But see, e.g., Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 809, 815–18 (2007) (“[A] lack of private space . . . will threaten survival.”).
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flexibility of their property arrangements (and defense of territorial
property) reflects this pro-social orientation.95 From prehistoric man to
Native-American tribes to modern communes, people have cohabitated in
groups, foregone private-property systems and stable settlement bounds,
and lived nomadically.96 In order for social groups to function, individuals
must submit at times to various social and physical incursions that are
acceptable to the group, or a dominant force within the group, but
undesirable to the affected individual.97 Inclinations toward absolute
defense of individual or family territory would reduce the cooperative
enterprises necessary for survival.98 Territoriality, in the sense of robust
defense of private property, is a “strategy that can be turned on and off”99
when circumstances alter its efficiency.100 Fourth Amendment protection
of the home responds to normative values that are subject to debate,
prioritization, and fluctuation, not to biological imperative.101
The current Fourth Amendment approach has conflated privacy, a
concept that is essentially relational, with the protection of physical
space.102 Contrary to the notion of residential privacy as spatial exclusion,
psychologists study privacy in the domain of interaction.103 Privacy
enables control over self-disclosure and allows others to access the
individual’s self.104
In their interactions and relationships, people

95 In many instances, people employ territorial strategies to increase, not prevent, social
contacts. See Peter H. Klopfer & Daniel I. Rubenstein, The Concept Privacy and Its Biological
Basis, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 52, 54 (1977).
96 See, e.g., SACK, supra note 83, at 7–9 (describing Chippewa Indian settlements).
97 Territoriality serves a constellation of functions, none of which maps onto residential
criminal search. Owners or residents involved in criminal investigations are not resisting
territorial invasion in order to affect their neighbors’ behaviors or norms, increase the likelihood
of passing on their genes, or personalize or mark territory to signal vigilance or community
investment. Cf. Ralph B. Taylor & Sidney Brower, Home and Near-Home Territories, in HOME
ENVIRONMENTS 183, 193 (Irwin Altman & Carol M. Werner eds., 1985).
98 See SACK, supra note 83, at 24.
99 Id.
100 Territoriality studies focus on defense of feeding areas in situations where such defense is
efficient. See Rada Dyson-Hudson & Eric Alden Smith, Human Territoriality: An Ecological
Reassessment, 80 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 21, 22 (1978); Marshall D. Sahlins, The Social Life of
Monkeys, Apes and Primitive Man, in THE EVOLUTION OF MAN’S CAPACITY FOR CULTURE 54,
57 (J.N. Spuhler ed., 1959) (comparing territoriality in subhuman primates with primitive social
behavior).
101 A variety of forces other than evolution shape human behavior: social drives, cultural
learning and reproduction, and environmental changes. An evolutionary or biological explanation
for territoriality would be tautological. See SACK, supra note 83, at 21.
102 See e.g., supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
103 See IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 18 (1975) (defining
privacy regulation as a means to achieve an individual’s or a group’s optimum level of social
interaction and access to the self); Patricia Brierley Newell, Perspectives on Privacy, 15 J.
ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 87, 91–93, 94–97 (1995).
104 See ALTMAN, supra note 103, at 18; Kenneth Einar Himma, Separation, Risk, and the
Necessity of Privacy to Well-Being: A Comment on Adam Moore’s Toward Informational Privacy
Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 850 (2007) (“The need for personal space is not the same as
the need for privacy. My need to have a home of my own . . . is primarily motivated by a desire
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perennially engage in strategic self-presentation in order to shape others’
views of their personality and disposition.105 Physical space is important
only insofar as it secures the ability to expose or conceal different aspects
of our self to others.106 Even Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous description
of privacy as “the right to be let alone” has a relational interpretation: we
often wish others to leave us alone to eventually rejoin them, and we want
government to leave us alone to safeguard the individuality and spontaneity
essential to social existence.107
B. Theory Versus Evidence: The Personhood Interest in Residential
Privacy
A principal claim in the scholarly literature is that residential privacy
and the right of exclusionary control of the physical home are vital to
identity and psychological well-being—indeed, to an individual’s very
personhood. In her influential theory of property for personhood, Margaret
Radin argued that certain kinds of property, with homes as the
paradigmatic example, constitute an individual’s self, enable proper selfdevelopment, and encourage human flourishing.108 By virtue of the
personhood connection, the law should accord owners broad liberty to
control such property.109
Based on the personhood interest in the home, Radin championed
strict protection of privacy rights in residential search and seizure. She
argued that personhood property provides a normative guide for Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and underscores the need for heightened
protection in the home and possibly in vehicles as well.110 Other scholars
echoed Radin’s call for stringent protection of privacy rights in residential

for security, not privacy.”); Patricia Brierley Newell, A Systems Model of Privacy, 14 J. ENVTL.
PSYCHOL. 65, 75–76 (1994) (reporting that when asked about their actions to acquire privacy,
less than half of subjects mentioned places and that a quarter of subjects included social
interaction or other prosocial behavior as part of their privacy experiences).
105 See Roy F. Baumeister, A Self-Presentational View of Social Phenomena, 91 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 3, 3 (1982) (explaining that self-presentation is “aimed at establishing . . . an image of the
individual in the minds of others”); Edward E. Jones & Thane S. Pittman, Toward a General
Theory of Strategic Self-Presentation, in 1 PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE SELF 231,
233 (Jerry Suls ed., 1982) (defining strategic self-presentation as “those features of behavior . . .
designed to elicit or shape others’ attributions of the actor’s dispositions” (emphasis omitted)).
106 See ALTMAN, supra note 103, at 18 (stating that privacy is important only to the extent
that it allows individuals to restrict access to themselves); Glenorchy McBride, Privacy: A
Relationship Model, 7 MAN-ENV’T SYS. 145, 148 (1977) (arguing that possession or ownership
of “any space, personal, real estate, or temporary, may appear at first sight to be an individual
construct [of privacy], yet since it always concerns access, ownership is in fact a statement of
social relationships between people”).
107 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66, at 193; cf. Bascuas, supra note 23, at 585 (observing that
Justice Brandeis’s formulation “is more a rhetorical than a categorical characterization”).
108 See Radin, supra note 2, at 967–68.
109 See id. at 960, 978.
110 See id. at 996–1002.
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property on the basis of the prodigious “psychic toll” to personhood.111
The empirical evidence does not support personhood theory’s claim
that exclusionary control over the physical home is a requisite constituent
of personal identity and psychosocial functioning.112 American homes are
not personhood property, inextricably intertwined with self and identity,
but commodities that on average are bought, sold, or rented every five
years.113 Research shows that homes play a role, but not a starring one, in
self-concept. Contrary to the notion that control over the physical home is
of the utmost importance to self and personhood, subjects rate
relationships, personal characteristics, and body parts as more closely
connected to self than physical possessions.114 Moreover, evidence
suggests that exercising control over an object, such as one’s dwelling,
does not substantially increase the object’s connection to the self.115 Within
the home, residents use household possessions in a utilitarian fashion and
do not strongly link those items to personal identity;116 the exceptions—
111 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 2, at 6 (arguing that the harms to personhood resulting from
residential search may merit compensation to the occupants of the home).
112 Although Radin’s account focuses heavily on property, she does recognize the social and
relational aspects of home. See Radin, supra note 2, at 1013 (“Our reverence for the sanctity of
the home is rooted in the understanding that the home is inextricably part of the individual, the
family, and the fabric of society.”). In general, Radin’s theory is somewhat amorphous and does
not specify whether the crux of the personhood interest is to be a person, to be a particular person,
to retain the same identity, or even to have a personality. Compare id. at 957 (“[T]o achieve
proper self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over resources in the
external environment.”), with id. at 968 (“If an object you now control is bound up in your future
plans or in your anticipation of your future self, and it is partly these plans for your own
continuity that make you a person, then your personhood depends on the realization of these
expectations.”).
113 See KRISTIN A. HANSEN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SEASONALITY OF MOVES AND
DURATION OF RESIDENCE 4 (1998), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p7066.pdf; see also Susan Saegert, The Role of Housing in the Experience of Dwelling, in HOME
ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 97, at 287, 290 (stating that the connection people feel toward their
homes “depends on the housing market, the rental market, and the job market”). Unlike in the
United States, homes in some cultures are imbued with personhood. For example, the Zuni view
the home as a living thing and the principle setting for communication with the spirit world, and
the Tswana of South Africa believe that the spirits of their ancestors reside in the home’s
courtyard. See Carol M. Werner et al., Temporal Aspects of Homes: A Transactional Perspective,
in HOME ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 97, at 1, 8, 20.
114 See Ernst Prelinger, Extension and Structure of the Self, 47 J. PSYCHOL. 13, 14–23 (1959)
(presenting the results of a study asking adult subjects to rate eight categories of items on a scale
of whether those items were “definitely a part of your own self”). One study that asked
participants to rate items on a self/not-self scale found that relatives and friends, as well as body
organs and even favorite vacation place, received higher ratings than dwelling. See Russell W.
Belk, Identity and the Relevance of Market, Personal, and Community Objects, in MARKETING
AND SEMIOTICS 151, 154–56 (Jean Umiker-Sebeok ed., 1987). Subjects rated the following
items very similarly to current dwelling: favorite casual clothes, favorite vehicle now owned, and
favorite book. Id. at 155. Also relevant to Fourth Amendment law, at least one study has found
that subjects rank cars similarly to homes in terms of consumer’s attachment and integration of
the object into self-concept. See A. Dwayne Ball & Lori H. Tasaki, The Role and Measurement
of Attachment in Consumer Behavior, 1 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 155, 166 (1992).
115 See Prelinger, supra note 114, at 19.
116 In general, the psychology and sociology literature does not indicate, as Radin proposes,
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rarely the target of criminal investigation—are family heirlooms, diaries,
and photographs.117
The experimental research suggests that discrete privacy invasions of
physical spaces that leave social relationships intact do not damage self or
psychosocial functioning.118 Individuals are surprisingly adaptable to even
acute losses in residential spaces.119 For example, psychologists have
found that victims of natural disasters—whose houses are not merely
searched but destroyed—typically do not suffer long-term mental health
impairment.120 High-quality relationships, not the physical home or
residential privacy, are what is essential to self and psychosocial
functioning.121
A related theory in the privacy literature is that the incursion on
privacy in general, not the personhood-securing nature of residential
privacy rights in particular, causes the harm.122 Privacy scholars have long
recognized a personhood interest in privacy irrespective of property or
place.123 On this view, privacy enables personhood by safeguarding “those
that the home is a requisite constituent of personhood. Cf. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 22–25 (1959) (describing the role of the “setting” for
individuals’ functioning).
117 See Deborah A. Prentice, Psychological Correspondence of Possessions, Attitudes, and
Values, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 993, 995–96 (1987); see also MIHALY
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS: DOMESTIC
SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 55–58 (1981) (identifying ten categories “symptomatic of what kinds of
things people cherish in their homes”).
118 See Lois M. Haggard & Carol M. Werner, Situational Support, Privacy Regulation, and
Stress, 11 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 313, 334 (1990) (discussing how an experimental
privacy invasion, in the form of a confederate entering and lingering in a subject’s room, did not
cause objective harm to the subject’s mood or assessment of the environment and actually
improved the subject’s performance of a secondary task). Instead, the research literature suggests
that only a profound and longstanding loss of privacy in an individual’s residence will threaten
her personhood. See David A. D’Atri, Psychophysiological Responses to Crowding, 7 ENV’T &
BEHAV. 237, 247–50 (1975) (discussing a study that found a correlation between the number of
inmates sharing a given space and the inmates’ blood pressure levels).
119 For example, long-term disability, which has massive and irreversible impacts on privacy
in the home, typically does not decrease happiness. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON
HAPPINESS 152–53 (2006) (noting that disabled persons can adapt quickly to their conditions).
120 See Peter Steinglass & Ellen Gerrity, Forced Displacement to a New Environment, in
STRESSORS AND THE ADJUSTMENT DISORDERS 399, 401 (Joseph D. Noshpitz & R. Dean
Coddington eds., 1990). A few studies have even found that forced relocation due to natural
disaster predicts increased satisfaction with family life and neighborhood relations. See, e.g.,
Thomas E. Drabek et al., The Impact of Disaster on Kin Relationships, 37 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
481, 490–92 (1975) (family life); Harry Estill Moore, Some Emotional Concomitants of Disaster,
42 MENTAL HYGIENE 45, 49–50 (1958) (neighborhood relations).
121 See Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680,
680 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (“Selfhood is almost unthinkable outside a social
context . . . . Selves are . . . tools for relating to other people.”); see also JOHN T. CACIOPPO &
WILLIAM PATRICK, LONELINESS: HUMAN NATURE AND THE NEED FOR SOCIAL CONNECTION
240 (2008) (noting that quality, not quantity, of relationships predicts loneliness).
122 Alternatively, the fact that the government is the home invader may create the harm that
results from residential search. If this is the case though, then it calls into question public
acceptance of housing inspection and zoning.
123 See Kelvin, supra note 89, at 259 (“It is only in a condition of perceived privacy that one
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attributes of an individual which are irreducible in his selfhood”124 and
protecting, as Warren and Brandeis describe, an individual’s self-definition
of his or her “inviolate personality.”125 This conception of personhood
might support, for example, the role of privacy in Fourteenth Amendment
cases addressing sexuality, sodomy, and contraception, but it does not
explain housing exceptionalism or the assumption that government search
of the home invariably threatens personhood.126 If personhood accrues
more squarely to privacy than property or homes, this relationship calls into
question the privileging of the home in Fourth Amendment doctrine
relative to comparable nonresidential privacy interests.
In addition, personhood theory suffers from indeterminacy and a
tendency toward absolutism. It does not provide a viable litmus test for
differentiating between protected and unprotected interests. As Jed
Rubenfeld writes, “Where is our self-definition not at stake?”127
Compounding this problem, the moral character of personhood and the
rights language of privacy push toward absolutism: once identified, rights
warrant strict protection.128
Perhaps one of the more compelling arguments for personhood and
residential privacy—which personhood theory does not, but should, make
explicit—is that control over privacy signals status.129 Government action
symbolizes social judgments as to an individual’s status and worth.130
Individuals who are subject to privacy invasions on an ongoing basis may
perceives oneself removed and protected from the power of others: and it is only to the extent that
one has this sense of privacy that one can feel truly oneself, and responsible for one’s
actions . . . .”).
124 Paul A. Freund, Professor, Harvard Law School, Address to the American Law Institute
(May 23, 1975), in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 52ND ANNUAL MEETING 568, 574 (1976);
see also JEFFREY REIMAN, CRITICAL MORAL LIBERALISM: THEORY & PRACTICE 165 (1997)
(“The right to privacy is the right to the existence of a social practice that makes it possible for me
to think of this existence as mine. . . . The right to privacy, then, protects the individual’s interest
in becoming, being, and remaining a moral person.” (emphasis added)); Jeffrey H. Reiman,
Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 (1976) (stating that privacy
confers a “moral title to [one’s] existence” (emphasis omitted)).
125 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 66, at 205.
126 See W.H. Foddy & W.R. Finighan, The Concept of Privacy from a Symbolic Interaction
Perspective, 10 J. FOR THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 1, 6 (1980) (“Privacy is the possession by an
individual of control over information that would interfere with the acceptance of his claims for
an identity within a specified role relationship.” (emphasis omitted)).
127 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 754–55 (1989).
128 See William R. Lund, Politics, Virtue, and the Right to Do Wrong: Assessing the
Communitarian Critique of Rights, 28 J. SOC. PHIL. 101, 104, 107 (1997) (quoting Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s statement that “rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme”); see also ETZIONI, supra note 38, at 190 (“As the right to privacy is viewed as an
inalienable right, it does not yield to the common good.”).
129 See Newell, supra note 103, at 93 (reviewing empirical studies of human behavior and
finding that dominant or powerful individuals establish themselves in more private spaces and
strongly enforce privacy boundaries).
130 In a self-report experiment that asked subjects to describe a situation where they
preferred privacy, 76 percent of subjects mentioned whether others had respected their privacy.
See Newell, supra note 104, at 74.
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infer that others do not find them worthy of respect131 and ultimately come
to believe they are, in fact, not worthy of respect. This impugns the
common practices of repeat Terry stops and vehicular searches that
disproportionately affect poor and minority individuals.132 Constricting the
scope of residential search protection or lowering the standard for home
searches may also disproportionately impact poor and minority individuals
if the history of discriminatory targeting holds true. This underscores the
need to address discriminatory police conduct; in the face of narrowed
constitutional protection, the creation of statutory remedies and tortlike
compensation can address discriminatory search or targeting.133
C. An Evidence-Based Analysis of Subjective Expectations of Privacy
Turning to the realm of public opinion, the Supreme Court has used
subjective expectations of privacy to justify the blunt and expansive
approach of housing exceptionalism.134 The doctrinal assumption appears
to be that citizens hold uniformly high perceptions of intrusiveness for a
wide array of residential search contexts.135 The empirical evidence reveals
a more variable and nuanced picture of residential privacy expectations and
indicates that some contexts of home search, such as certain outdoor
residential searches, do not raise strong privacy concerns.136 Meanwhile,
contexts of search that do not necessarily involve the home, such as
wiretapping, searching luggage on a bus, or tapping into a corporation’s
computer, receive higher intrusiveness ratings than most categories of
residential search.137 This research raises a serious question of whether
courts have assumed a more uniform and robust privacy expectation in
various aspects of the home than citizens themselves.
In their seminal study of privacy expectations, Christopher Slobogin
and Joseph Schumacher asked individuals to rate the degree of “invasion of
privacy or autonomy” in various search scenarios.138 They found that
131 See Taslitz, supra note 22, at 15; see also Altman, supra note 90, at 68 (“A person who
can successfully control interaction with others is likely to develop more of a sense of
competence and self-worth than a person who fails repeatedly to regulate contacts with others.”).
132 See Taslitz, supra note 22, at 15, 21–22 (noting the concern of minority group members
that police officers stop young black males without reason).
133 For example, Christopher Slobogin has suggested that an independent ombudsman could
administer a damages remedy and assess monetary damages against individual police officers, for
discriminatory action, and departments, for failure to train officers on race issues. See SLOBOGIN,
supra note 11, at 37.
134 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
135 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text.
136 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 16, at 739–41 (noting that safety inspections of
residences and inspections of burned-down houses do not implicate substantial privacy concerns
but still receive Fourth Amendment protection).
137 See id. at 738–39 (body cavity searches and wiretaps received higher intrusiveness scores
than bedroom searches and other residential searches); Blumenthal et al., supra note 16, at 358
tbl.1 (tapping into corporation’s computer and perusing bank records received higher
intrusiveness ratings than any type of residential search).
138 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 16, at 736.
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subjects gave markedly different privacy scores, for example, to searching
curbside garbage, watching a person in the yard with binoculars, and
searching a bedroom.139 Subsequent independent research has replicated
these findings.140 Slobogin and Schumacher observed that some privacy
expectations, such as the perceived unintrusiveness of curbside garbage
searches and aerial curtilage searches, are consistent with Fourth
Amendment doctrine while other privacy expectations diverge from Fourth
Amendment doctrine.141 The variability in intrusiveness ratings for
residential search scenarios casts doubt on the doctrinal tendency to treat
the home, absent publicity or a specified exception, as a “force field” of
uniformly elevated privacy expectations.
Although Slobogin and Schumacher did not manipulate this variable
explicitly, their results also suggest that expectations of residential privacy
concentrate in the interior living spaces of the home and diminish in
exterior spaces.142 Subjects rated searches of bedrooms, interiors of mobile
homes, and college dorm rooms as highly intrusive but rated searches of
garages, aerial surveillance of yards, and searches of curbside garbage as
moderately or minimally intrusive.143 Their findings also suggest a strong
privacy interest in interpersonal exchange. For example, subjects gave
wiretaps the highest intrusiveness rating. Similarly, we can speculate that
subjects may have rated searches of the bedroom as highly intrusive
because of its strong association with interpersonal relationships and sexual
intimacy.144
Of course, subjective expectations alone cannot justify Fourth
Amendment protection. Citizens’ expectations of privacy may impose
prohibitively high social costs, threaten undue impacts on insulated groups
or minorities, or diverge too sharply from objective harm.145 Scholars have

139 The study did not assess several residential contexts that frequently receive Fourth
Amendment protection, such as searches of garbage within curtilage or searches of specific
interior rooms other than a bedroom. See id. at 729, 738–39 tbl.1.
140 See Blumenthal et al., supra note 16, at 345 (“Our subjects’ intrusiveness ratings are
quite consistent with [Slobogin and Schumacher’s] results; each of our samples correlated highly
with their overall data.”).
141 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 16, at 739–40.
142 See id. at 738–39. They did find that subjects rated open-field searches as moderately
intrusive. See id. However, from the perspective of relational privacy, this item may have
conflated property-focused expectations of autonomy with privacy-focused expectations of
autonomy because the authors framed the question as being about privacy and autonomy and
described the open field as being surrounded by a fence and “No Trespassing” signs. See id. at
736.
143 See id. at 738–39.
144 Obtaining information through the use of undercover agents also received moderately
high intrusiveness ratings. See id.; see also Kelvin, supra note 89, at 255 (sexual intercourse
typically subject to strong norms of privacy).
145 Subjective expectations of privacy may not track objective harm: laboratory studies of
minor privacy invasions show that subjects complain about intrusion and privacy violations but
report no negative effects on mood or task performance. See Haggard & Werner, supra note 118,
at 334.
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long complained that reasonable expectations of privacy are amorphous
and uncertain146 and suffer from an inescapable circularity between existing
law and expectations.147 At the same time, Fourth Amendment doctrine
should not neglect privacy expectations entirely, especially in light of the
propensity for searches perceived as highly intrusive to inflict
psychological or other harm.148
III
POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL RATIONALES FOR PRIVILEGING THE HOME
Political concerns and constitutional originalism are fundamental to
modern jurisprudence on residential search and seizure. A principal
purpose of Fourth Amendment protection is to guard against police
overreaching; the physical home is particularly vulnerable on this account
because of the many possessions it contains as well as the political value of
a zone of governmental noninterference. The Supreme Court has also
privileged the physical home on the theory that the Framers intended its
utmost protection. Original intent has guided the Court’s, and particularly
Justice Scalia’s, interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.149
A. Political Rationales: The Dangers of Government Overreaching
The political rationales for housing exceptionalism revolve around the
common axis of limiting government’s reach. First, courts fear that absent
the constraints of a warrant and probable cause the police will be able to
ransack a house and its curtilage for evidence unrelated to the crime under
investigation and use that information to harass, coerce, or prosecute the
suspect.150 According to this account, the multitude of personal property,
records, and effects within houses creates an exceptional risk of police

146 See, e.g., Bascuas, supra note 23, at 580 (describing reasonable expectations of privacy
as “subjective specters that . . . judges view idiosyncratically”); Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the
“Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077,
1128 (1987) (“The potentially limitless number of factors relevant to the determination whether a
given expectation of privacy is ‘reasonable’ has resulted in confusion and uneven application of
constitutional doctrine.”).
147 See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188; cf. Bailey H. Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally Protecting Reasonable
Expectations, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 19, 32–33 (1997) (arguing that this circularity enables a
feedback mechanism because it cannot be avoided completely).
148 See Kelvin, supra note 89, at 252 (Privacy refers to a “subjective state . . . . [P]rivacy is
perceived privacy.”).
149 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
150 See United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 322 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that the
ultimate question for the Fourth Amendment is “‘whether, if the particular form of [conduct]
practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of
privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with
the aims of a free and open society’” (quoting 1 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 3.2, at 165 (1984))); cf. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under
the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 53 (1995) (proposing additional privacy protections
for property or information seized by government).
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overreaching and harassment.
Government overreaching is indisputably a proper concern of the
Fourth Amendment, but there is reason to doubt that Fourth Amendment
doctrine and housing exceptionalism effectively address this risk.
Concerns of overreaching and harassment may justify a subset of
residential protections but not the expansive and categorical reach of the
home. Thermal scans of the home, for example, receive substantial
protection despite the fact that the limited range of information discernible
by the technology sharply constrains police overreaching in a given search.
Also, contrary to the assumption that homes are uniquely vulnerable, the
potential for overreaching and harassment appears higher in nonresidential
contexts that currently receive more limited protection, such as searches of
financial records and computer storage.151
Even if the home is uniquely susceptible to overreaching, the plainview seizure doctrine calls into question the ability of the Fourth
Amendment to prevent this harm. The case law has clearly established that
the police have a right to seize evidence that is in plain view so long as they
are lawfully searching the area that contains the evidence and they have
probable cause to believe that it is evidence of criminal activity.152 Because
so much is in plain view of the police during many searches, this doctrine
undoes much of the protection against overreaching that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to confer.153 It is not evident why probable cause and
warrant protection, rather than warrant substitutes and a rule restricting
seizure to the subject of the search (i.e., a rule that is the opposite of the
plain-view seizure doctrine), are the solutions to the problem of
overreaching.154
The second major rationale for privileging residential privacy is that
the home affords a haven from the reach of government. In this view, the
home should establish a bright line that government may not cross. This
line creates a zone of privacy and autonomy that is essential to human
151 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 319 (2008) (describing data-mining efforts by the federal government);
Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its
De-evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 84 (2008) (arguing for
strengthening employee privacy rights particularly as technology and workplace flexibility erode
the strict division between work and home).
152 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134–36 (1990) (establishing standard for the
plain-view seizure doctrine); cf. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987) (holding that
when police move objects in homes to obtain a better view, they initiate a separate search subject
to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement).
153 It is not clear whether the plain-view seizure doctrine operates as a release valve when
the stringency of Fourth Amendment doctrine threatens crime-control needs, or whether the
Fourth Amendment reduces the impact of the plain view doctrine by constraining the scope and
reducing the number of searches that may give rise to corollary seizures. Most likely, both are
true.
154 Doctrines prohibiting police actions that bear the indices of harassment, such as
prosecuting for minor violations, repeatedly searching a particular person or group, or using
crimes unrelated to the original investigation to obtain pleas, could also address these concerns.
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flourishing and productive citizenship. If it is true that a quantum of
autonomy and privacy protection is necessary, and I am willing to accept
that premise, then it seems that the Supreme Court has given away the
farm. As Professor Stuntz has observed, residential searches represent a
small fraction of total search activity.155 If the goal is to provide citizens
with a robust zone of noninterference, then it is difficult to offer a
principled explanation for the choice of the home over more common
search contexts, including the modern-day, computerized equivalents of
“papers[] and effects” cited in the Fourth Amendment.156
B. Originalism Revisited
The Supreme Court has repeatedly trumpeted fidelity to the Framers’
intent in Fourth Amendment cases, asserting that stringent protection of the
physical home follows from the plain language of the Fourth
Amendment.157 Justice Scalia has stated that in cases of residential search,
courts should strive for the “preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”158
The historical record and scholarship offer a more nuanced view of the
claims of original intent.
Residential property was an important privacy concern in the
Founding Era, but it was not the only important concern.159 Mail and
writings were a particularly strong focus of early colonial privacy rights.
Court cases, internal post office regulation, and the Organic Postal Act of
1825 accorded near-absolute protection to mail.160 Judicial opinions of that

155 See Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1061 (“[P]rotecting privacy in the home casts a smaller
substantive shadow than protecting privacy in glove compartments or jacket pockets.”).
156 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
157 Cf. Maclin, supra note 18, at 896–97 (“[T]he Justices consult the history of the
Amendment on a selective basis . . . . [T]he Article proposes that the Court stop considering the
historical origins of the Fourth Amendment unless it is able to develop a more effective and
consistent method by which to do so.”).
158 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 589 (1980) (Fourth Amendment protection of privacy rights in the home “finds its roots in
clear and specific constitutional terms: ‘The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . .
shall not be violated.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
159 See Fabio Arcila, In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law
History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 10–12 (2007) (describing
controversy over writs of assistance); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 590 (1999) (“[T]he Framers adopted constitutional search
and seizure provisions with the precise aim of ensuring the protection of person and house by
prohibiting legislative approval of general warrants.” (emphasis added)). But see David E.
Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding Revisited, 33
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 48–49 (2005) (arguing that in the Framing Era, the Fourth
Amendment applied only to unlawful house searches).
160 Because postmasters started the first newspapers, citizens suspected that private mail
would become public news. In addition, concerns circulated during the revolutionary period that
governments were opening or tampering with mail and that private individuals would steal mail
in order to glean information about each others’ assets and commit theft or fraud. See DAVID J.
SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 9–16 (1978); Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping
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era observed that “papers are often the dearest property a man can have,”161
and commentators charged that the paramount harm in residential search
was having a man’s “desks broken open, his private books, letters, and
papers exposed to prying curiosity.”162
Close examination of the historical record also suggests that the home
and residential privacy meant something quite different than they do
today.163 Contrary to modern-day sentiments, the consternation over
residential searches in the Founding Era was not about the home as a sacred
domestic sphere or lynchpin of psychological autonomy. Instead, concern
focused squarely on the specific practice of customs and revenue searches
of houses under general warrants or writs of assistance.164 Thomas Davies
observes that the common law of the era provided sufficient protection
against unjustified intrusion and that warrantless searches were generally
presumed illegitimate.165 However, the common law could not adequately
police against the risk that future legislation would make general warrants
legal in the future.166 As William Cuddihy explains, “Open your front door,
ran the argument, and the extent of federal invasion will be infinite.”167
The outcry over the home, which was particularly evocative under English
and colonial common law, was an effective strategy for attacking the
legality of general warrants.168
Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV.
553, 562–68 (2007); see also Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Martin (o.s.) 297, 297–98 (Orleans 1811)
(writer of letter may enjoin its unauthorized publication or disclosure).
161 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817–18 (K.B.) (quoted in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 627–28 (1886)).
162 COOLEY, supra note 65, at 306. In the modern day, the link between houses and papers
is attenuated. As Ricardo Bascuas observes, “Houses . . . are no longer the primary repository of
the very papers and effects the Framers most sought to protect.” Bascuas, supra note 23, at 580;
see also Stuntz, supra note 14, at 1060 (“The dominant paradigm in search and seizure law has
always been the ransacking of a private home, with an emphasis on rummaging around through
the homeowner’s books and papers.”).
163 For example, protection of the person from privacy invasions featured prominently in
these historical accounts. See William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not
His Castle: Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY
Q. 371, 372 (1980) (describing how the Fourth Amendment was a break from, rather than an
extension of, the English tradition of “house as castle,” which offered primarily discretionary
protection and led to frequent intrusions on the home).
164 See Davies, supra note 159, at 551 (“[T]he historical concerns were almost exclusively
about the need to ban house searches under general warrants.”).
165 See id. at 645–46; cf. CUDDIHY, supra note 18, at 771 (“The prevention of general
warrants at the federal level was the preponderant motivation behind the amendment . . . . Why
debate probable cause for a specific warrant to search one house when a general warrant laid
entire towns open to government purview?”); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 218 (1993) (noting that while the Framers were not
directly concerned with warrantless searches, such searches were a matter of public concern).
166 See Davies, supra note 159, at 590 (arguing that, for this reason, the Framers adopted
constitutional search and seizure provisions).
167 See CUDDIHY, supra note 18, at 766.
168 See Davies, supra note 159, at 603. In Davies’s view, the house was important
intrinsically as well as strategically. He writes that even though modern cases recognize the
unique status of the home at common law, “the rhetoric of modern doctrine falls short of

2010]

THE INVIOLATE HOME

131

More broadly, scholars dispute whether the primary goal of the
Constitution was to protect civil liberties, including privacy. In his
scholarship on individual liberties, G. Edward White writes that “the
central concerns of those who had convened at Philadelphia and drafted the
Constitution . . . were not with what modern commentators would call the
‘civil liberties’ of Americans. . . . They were concerned, fundamentally,
with the allocation of sovereign powers between the states and a central
government in America.”169 Cuddihy similarly observes that the Fourth
Amendment “was no monument to civil libertarian altruism. . . . Madison
did not write the amendment because its ideas commanded constitutional
expression but because he was under the political gun of
Antifederalism.”170 The Framers intended the Bill of Rights to garner
support for a federal republic.171
Even if the historical record were to reveal home protection as a
critical impetus for constitution-making or an exclusive stronghold of
colonial privacy concerns, there is still reason to avoid a strict originalist
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.172
Importing the Fourth
Amendment’s purpose to restrict general warrants in the specific historical
context of customs and revenue searches to the modern criminal justice
system is misguided.173 Davies explains, “Singling out and applying a
specific common-law doctrine in a modern—that is, changed and foreign—
context will often produce results that are different from, or even
inconsistent with, the purpose the rule served in its historical milieu.”174
Moreover, as Tracey Maclin observes, “The reach and meaning of the
recognizing the unique status accorded the house at common law. The domicile was a sacrosanct
interest in late eighteenth-century common law . . . .” Id. at 642. Accordingly, the house
received greater legal protection than places of business and ships. See CUDDIHY, supra note 18,
at 770 (“[T]he dwelling house was not only the focus but a frontier of the framers’ concern with
privacy, for they accorded places of business lesser protection from promiscuous search and
seizure, and ships, in the Collection Act, almost none.”).
169 G. Edward White, Revisiting the Ideas of the Founding 12, 25 (Univ. Va. Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 132, 2009), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1202&context=uvalwps.
170 CUDDIHY, supra note 18, at 770.
171 See White, supra note 169, at 24 (claiming that the Bill of Rights signaled the limited
power of federal government). The Founders were attuned to the issues of corruption and
government tyranny but perceived that the solution lay with a central government, not scrutiny of
civil liberties violations. See id. at 26.
172 See Davies, supra note 159, at 740–41 (“Applying the original meaning of the language
of the Fourth Amendment in a completely changed social and institutional context would subvert
the purpose the Framers had in mind when they adopted the text.”).
173 But see Steinberg, supra note 159, at 74 (arguing that the eighteenth-century
understanding of the Fourth Amendment limited its scope to unlawful house searches and also
arguing for a return to that understanding “not because eighteenth century views on law
enforcement are particularly relevant today. . . [but] because we lack coherent, principled
alternatives”).
174 Davies, supra note 159, at 743. This statement is especially true given the degree of
indeterminacy in the original Fourth Amendment. Maclin observes that beyond the specific
prohibition of general warrants, “the scope and meaning of the Fourth Amendment was just
beginning to develop” in the Constitutional Era. See Maclin, supra note 18, at 968.
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Fourth Amendment for our society should not be constrained by the
expectations of those who lived in 1791.”175 The privacy concerns of a
preindustrial nation, newly seceded from Britain, are not the concerns of a
technology-rich democracy and complex criminal justice system two
hundred years later.
IV
DETHRONING THE PHYSICAL HOME IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
To date, the case law and scholarship have assumed that housing
exceptionalism affords the utmost respect to residential privacy. One aim
of this Article is to illustrate how reflexive protection and property-focused
safeguards of the physical home devalue the interests at the heart of privacy
protection. Contrary to claims in the judicial precedents and scholarly
literature, privacy and exclusionary control over a liberally defined home
are not requisite to personhood, objective well-being, or, in some instances,
subjective expectations of privacy.176 Residential search is also not
uniquely vulnerable to government harassment nor is the home a
particularly effective privacy stronghold against the reach of government.
The focus on the physical home in the Fourth Amendment has in turn
obscured the privacy harms at stake in residential search protection and
romanticized the home into a veritable force field of domestic relations.177
This Article proposes replacing the expansive and formalistic protection of
the physical home, and the rhetoric surrounding residential privacy, with a
doctrinal focus on substantive privacy and intimate association.
A. From Iconic Property to Substantive Privacy
In many instances, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has protected the
physical home too expansively and categorically, often at the expense of
substantive privacy. Many Fourth Amendment cases, such as in the
curtilage context, protect areas that are unlikely to implicate strong
substantive privacy interests. Other cases extend protection to searches of
living spaces that do not reveal personal information or breach domestic
life, such as certain technological scans. At the other extreme, courts have
allowed highly intrusive searches just outside the residential property line
despite the high likelihood of intrusion on domestic and intimate life.178
For example, at least one federal court of appeals has held that unaided
eavesdropping of activity within homes and hotels from a public vantage
point does not violate the Fourth Amendment.179 Although beyond the
175

See Maclin, supra note 18, at 971.
See supra Part II.
177 See supra Part I.
178 For example, some state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect the
interior of residences from observation with binoculars. See, e.g., People v. Arno, 15 Cal. Rptr.
2d 624, 627–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
179 See United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 1973).
176
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scope of this Article, substantive privacy and relational harm have also
been given short shrift in many nonresidential contexts, such as video
surveillance on public streets and searches of students in schools.180
The theory of privacy advanced in this Article seeks to reorient Fourth
Amendment residential privacy protection from the physical home to a
stronger, more consistent doctrinal focus on substantive privacy interests.
This proposal is not revolutionary. Long-established precedents hold that
“the home is sacred . . . because of . . . privacy interests in the activities that
take place within.”181 Yet, judicial application of this principle has been
inconsistent.
What is substantive privacy? Thus far, much of this Article has
defined substantive privacy by what it is not. It is not solicitude for the
physical housing structure. It is not a focus on property law. It is not the
precautionary extension of stringent Fourth Amendment protection to every
residential search, regardless of the costs to criminal enforcement and
degree of privacy harm. Curbing such housing exceptionalism enables
doctrines of substantive privacy and intimate association to develop in
residential search. A multiplicity of sources may inform the substantive
privacy inquiry, including privacy-oriented Fourth Amendment precedents,
concepts of privacy from common law and other legal sources, other
constitutional provisions, public perceptions, and evidence of psychological
or social impacts from privacy invasion. Admittedly, the specification of
substantive privacy in residential search is a long-term constitutional
project, particularly given the difficulty of envisioning all present and
future search contexts. This Article endeavors only to sketch the broad
parameters of substantive privacy and to offer illustrative examples of how
this analysis can inform residential search.
Substantive privacy in residential search addresses a constellation of
privacy impacts. I employ the term substantive privacy as distinct from
180 See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009)
(holding that a strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl was unconstitutional because the facts of the
case did not indicate cause for reasonable suspicion). With respect to video surveillance, some
local rules and state laws constrain such searches, but there is no comprehensive regulation or
case law directly addressing what protection the Fourth Amendment grants in these situations. In
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), the Court was equivocal in addressing the issue of
twenty-four-hour surveillance, noting that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as
respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.” Id. at 284; see also Christopher
Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72
MISS. L.J. 213, 219–33 (2002) (discussing the history, scope, and problems of closed-circuit
television surveillance in the United States and United Kingdom).
181 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984); see also Wilkins, supra note 146, at
1111–12 (“Before Katz, the home was protected simply because it was the home . . . . After Katz,
the home is a protected locale, not only by virtue of its explicit mention in the language of the
fourth amendment, but also (and perhaps primarily) because of the human activities innately
associated with it.”). It is also plausible to read intimate association into the language of the
Fourth Amendment protecting the “right of the people to be secure in their persons.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
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substantive due process, although substantive privacy may on occasion
overlap conceptually with areas of substantive due process protection. A
substantive approach to residential search addresses the disruption and
infringement of domestic life, especially harms to intimate association.
Substantive privacy encompasses psychological harm from privacy
invasion; this inquiry emphasizes objective harm. Subjective expectations
of privacy do figure in this analysis as required under Katz and as befits the
fact that searches perceived as extremely intrusive often correlate with
objective harm. However, where there is on an ex ante, categorical basis
only a modest level of perceived intrusiveness and no evidence or reason to
suspect objective harm, there is serious question whether the highest
standard of probable cause Fourth Amendment protection should apply.
Substantive privacy is also attentive to government overreaching and
considers whether repeat or ongoing search activity creates an incipient
threat of a police state. By considering substantive impact, as well as the
potential for widespread or continuous search activity, this inquiry limits
government more effectively than housing exceptionalism’s physical
“zone” of domestic privacy.
Among the substantive privacy interests at issue in residential settings,
the harm to intimate association is a critical, indeed prevailing, privacy
interest. Intimate association refers to interpersonal interaction and
relationships, particularly within the context of close relationships. Privacy
of intimate association disregards the physical home in favor of assessing
the likelihood that search activity will disrupt domestic life, engender
interpersonal conflict, reveal personal information that is private to and
constitutive of relationships, and chill socialization and intimacy.
Psychological and sociological studies converge on interpersonal
relationships as the reason for the significance that people attribute to the
home.182 The strongly relational character of residential privacy parallels
the preeminence of social relationships, not physical homes, in human
flourishing.183 Such relationships are of critical importance to self-concept,
intimacy and sense of belonging, social norms, and even physical health

182 See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 117, at 86 (reporting that 82
percent of people listed an object as among their most valued possession because it reminded
them of a close relative); GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION II: MARKETS,
MEANING, AND BRAND MANAGEMENT 35–46 (2005) (“[O]bjects are intended to recall the
presence of family and friendship relationships, personal achievements, family events, ritual
passages, and community associations.”).
183 See John T. Cacioppo et al., Loneliness Within a Nomological Net: An Evolutionary
Perspective, 40 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1054, 1080–82 (2006) (finding that social isolation is as
strong a risk factor for morbidity and mortality as smoking, poor exercise, and high blood
pressure); L. Elizabeth Crawford et al., Potential Mechanisms Through Which Loneliness Affects
Health, 37 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY S34, S34 (Supp. 2000) (describing in abstract links between
loneliness and poor-quality sleep and high blood pressure); Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor,
Understanding Personality and Social Behavior: A Functionalist Strategy, in THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 121, at 635, 657 (describing some benefits of intimate social
connections).
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and longevity.184
A Fourth Amendment theory of privacy of intimate association
derives principally from the precedent in Katz that reasonable expectations
of privacy must “protect people, not places.”185 Other key Supreme Court
precedents, particularly curtilage cases, state that protection should not
extend to areas that “do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government
interference or surveillance.”186 My account of substantive privacy places
relational harms front and center in residential search—indeed in the space
traditionally occupied by autonomy. This approach nonetheless safeguards
those who eschew social life by basing Fourth Amendment protection on
the categorical, ex ante likelihood of relational harm as well as on a more
encompassing account of substantive privacy.
Doctrines of substantive privacy and intimate association are not as
clear-cut as a property line. But, with proper doctrinal development, a
substantive approach can provide effective guidance to police. The
foundation of such development is to assess individual categories of
residential search and base protection on the ex ante likelihood of
substantive privacy and relational harm in each context. In the following
subpart, I discuss illustrative examples of residential search and potential
reforms on the basis of substantive privacy and intimate association.
B. Revisiting the Residential Protection Default
An approach focused on injury to substantive privacy and intimate
association unsettles the current constitutional default. Viewed through
this doctrinal lens, many contexts of residential search do not warrant their
current level of Fourth Amendment protection. Swathes of protection
currently afforded to sheds and garbage within residential property, for
example, as well as from heat-sensing technology, diminish under this
approach. In other instances, such as physical searches of interior living
spaces, the proxy of the home more closely tracks substantive privacy

184 See Snyder & Cantor, supra note 183, at 654; see also Setha M. Low & Irwin Altman,
Place Attachment: A Conceptual Inquiry, in PLACE ATTACHMENT 1, 7 (Irwin Altman & Setha M.
Low eds., 1992).
185 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (emphasis added). In contrast, Thomas
Crocker views relational privacy as a liberty interest that may be read into the Fourth Amendment
based on the Fourteenth Amendment. See Crocker, supra note 56, at 7–8 (“Lawrence protects
against forms of state intrusion into a person’s home and intimate life in ways that are instructive
for overcoming some of the worst consequences of the Fourth Amendment’s third-party
doctrine.”).
186 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); see also Segura, 468 U.S. at 810
(stating that the need to protect the home springs from “privacy interests in the activities that take
place within”). In addition, the Fourth Amendment security interest may provide another basis
for situating intimate association within the Fourth Amendment. Jed Rubenfeld argues that the
Fourth Amendment protects liberty within “personal life,” and presumably interpersonal life,
from the normalizing force of an unchecked government. See Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 127–
31.
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interests and Fourth Amendment protection appears sensible. Mindful of
the need to guide police action, the Fourth Amendment reforms I describe
in this Part employ ex ante, categorical protection based on the likelihood
that a specific context of search will harm substantive and relational
interests (i.e., not based on actual privacy harm to individual defendants).
The basic project of this Article, to reorient the focus of residential
search doctrine from the physical home to substantive privacy interests and
intimate association, is accomplishable in a few ways. First, we may
conclude that certain contexts of residential search are not, as a categorical
matter, likely to harm substantive privacy (or objectively reasonable
subjective expectations in the language of Katz) and exclude them from
Fourth Amendment protection. This option has the potential to eliminate
some of the most attenuated and questionable instances of search
protection. However, it may open the door to unrestrained search activity
and provide limited options for controlling repeat searches or ongoing
surveillance. A second option derives from Slobogin’s proposal for a
Fourth Amendment proportionality principle. The proportionality principle
enables a standard of reasonableness less than probable cause in some
instances based on the strength of the government justification relative to
the intrusiveness of the search.187 This proposal has interesting applications
to the present project of calibrating search protection to substantive privacy
harm, although the overlapping and conceptually ambiguous inquiry under
Katz complicates the analysis. Because the two-part test to determine
whether an action violates the Fourth Amendment implicates
reasonableness at both stages, substantive privacy interests may feature
repetitively (indeed, this awkwardness may be one reason physical property
has figured so heavily in the initial determination of Fourth Amendment
search).
The following sections apply a substantive privacy model, utilizing
both traditional approaches and proportionality analysis, to the Fourth
Amendment contexts of thermal-scanning technology, curtilage protection,
and physical searches of the home interior.
1.

Tethering Interior Search Protection to Substantive Privacy:
Kyllo and Technological Scanning of the Home

The Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of technological
invasions of the home.188 Such searches include certain kinds of visual
surveillance, tracking devices, and thermal scans. In United States v. Karo,
the Court ruled that police needed a warrant to track the location of a
beeper in private residences.189 More recently, in Kyllo v. United States,
the Court considered whether a warrantless thermal scan that revealed heat
187

See SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 38–39.
In particular, the Court has had to create Fourth Amendment doctrine to govern
technological invasions that the Wiretap Act does not regulate. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006).
189 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984).
188
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patterns indicative of a marijuana-growing operation constituted an
unconstitutional search.190 It held that the government conducts a Fourth
Amendment search when it uses a device not in general public use to
investigate the details of a home that would be unknowable absent physical
intrusion.191 The majority opinion employed strong and decisive language
about the preeminent importance of residential privacy, although the
holding left open a substantial loophole for residential searches that employ
technology that is in general use.192
Rather than reflexively defend the home or inquire as to whether a
technology is in general use, courts should determine whether a residential
scan reveals details of intimate association, is likely to chill or harm
relationships, or otherwise intrudes on the resident’s core privacy interests
by revealing personal information. A substantive model of privacy
suggests that extending probable cause search protection to technology that
does not reveal intimate, interpersonal, or personal information is
misguided. Prior to Kyllo, lower courts held that thermal scans and similar
searches were too “impersonal” to warrant Fourth Amendment
protection.193 Reorienting Fourth Amendment protection toward intimate
association and domestic life refines these holdings and provides an ex ante
means of differentiating between technologies that impermissibly encroach
on privacy and those that do not.
Such encroachments include
technological searches that are likely, as an ex ante, categorical matter, to
chill association, hamper authenticity and spontaneity, reveal the content of
interpersonal interaction, or otherwise expose personal or sensitive
information. In making this determination, courts should address the scan
or monitoring as employed and not the potentially privacy-threatening
aspects of the technology or undeveloped future technologies.194
By this metric, technologies that sense heat patterns indicating plant
growth or mere human presence do not threaten the core principles of
intimate association and substantive privacy.195 In Kyllo, Justice Scalia
railed that the thermal scan at issue could reveal “intimate details” such as
what hour the “the lady of the house” takes her bath.196 In fact, the
technology would have merely registered heat suggesting a human

190

533 U.S. 27, 29, 35–37 (2001).
See id. at 40.
192 See Slobogin, supra note 52, at 1393–94.
193 See, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058–59 (8th Cir. 1994).
194 See Alyson L. Rosenberg, Comment, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New Weapon
in the Fight Against Crime or a Fourth Amendment Violation?, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 135,
138–40 (1998); see also James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth
Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 438 (2002) (proposing that police
investigations using technologies that enhance human sensory capabilities and threaten genuine
interests in confidentiality are searches for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
195 Most Fourth Amendment scholars positively view the protection that Kyllo extends. For
a balanced assessment of the case, see Slobogin, supra note 52, at 1393–95.
196 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
191
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occupant and hot water.197
The attenuated privacy interest in protection from thermal scans
makes this type of search one of the better candidates for reclassification as
a non-search. Here, substantive privacy and intimate association suggest a
bright-line, ex ante rule excluding thermal scanning and comparable
technologies from Fourth Amendment search. Under Katz, there is little
evidence that revealing heat patterns infringes upon subjective expectations
of privacy, much less objectively reasonable expectations.198 There is
limited propensity for psychological harm from monitoring that reveals this
kind of impersonal physical information and specification. Indeed, this
information is not that different from the data utility companies gather
regarding energy and water usage, particularly under the emerging smartgrid systems that track consumption more precisely.199 It seems that
individuals do not perceive this type of monitoring as an intrusion, or they
readily habituate to ongoing collection of impersonal, physical
information.200
The most compelling reason to hesitate before removing thermal scans
from Fourth Amendment protection is not the privacy interest in heat
patterns but the potential for misuse of such technology and government
overreaching. Specifically, the police could employ thermal scans to
wrongly target, harass, or discriminate or, at the other extreme, install them
on every curbside. However, this problem does not inevitably require a
constitutional solution. If wrongful or ubiquitous search becomes an issue,
a variety of potential remedies are available, such as statutory constraints,
197 In addition, some forms of technological surveillance may enhance privacy by reducing
the need for more intrusive physical searches of the home. See Lee C. Milstein, Note, The
Fortress of Solitude or Lair of Malevolence? Rethinking the Desirability of Bright-Line
Protection of the Home, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1789, 1790–91 (2003).
198 Slobogin argues that the intrusiveness rankings for curtilage flyovers (ranked ten out of
fifty items, from least intrusive to most intrusive) and binocular observation of a person in a front
yard (ranked thirty-three out of fifty items) suggest that people view home surveillance using
enhancement devices as more intrusive than the Supreme Court appears to believe. See
SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 69–70. I disagree. First, the rankings, particularly for flyovers,
were minimal or moderate. Second, the type of information and interaction that spying with
binoculars potentially reveals is far more personal—and interpersonal—than a thermal scan.
Indeed, a thermal scan revealing a grow-light system is far more similar to a curtilage flyover,
which presumably is designed to detect illegal plant growth or other contraband, than to binocular
spying, which implicates interpersonal interaction and domestic life. The difference in
intrusiveness rankings may therefore be due to the greater potential for invasion of intimate
association and other privacy interests from binocular spying.
199 But see Jack I. Lerner & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Taking the “Long View” on the Fourth
Amendment: Stored Records and the Sanctity of the Home, 2008 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 45–
46 (arguing that detailed utility information should be within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment because it reveals private information about when a person is at home, sleeping,
bathing, etc.).
200 See id. For example, people continue to use the Internet despite the collection of
information about their web searches, an item arguably more personal than heat patterns.
Admittedly, many Internet items, such as breaking news, travel bookings, and blog cites, are
difficult, even impossible in modern life, to eschew. But even noncritical, discretionary internet
searches do not appear to be “chilled” by personal information collection.
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internal police rules, or liability for discriminatory search.201
2.

Correcting Overbreadth: The Example of Curtilage

The Fourth Amendment protects privacy rights in the area surrounding
the home from unreasonable search based on reasonable expectations of
privacy.202 Cases have held that a variety of areas adjacent to the home,
including gardens, garages, and mowed areas of residential lawns, are
protected curtilage.203 In United States v. Dunn, the Supreme Court
articulated a four-part test for determining whether an area is protected
curtilage.204 Three of the four factors in the Dunn test reference property
concepts: proximity to the house, enclosure, and steps taken by residents to
secure privacy on their property.205 Only one factor, the nature of the area’s
use, directly addresses interpersonal interests.206
The Court’s curtilage doctrine represents a partial evolution from a
property-oriented approach to a substantive-privacy approach that
emphasizes intimate association. In United States v. Oliver, the Court
defined curtilage as “the area to which extends the intimate activity
associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home,’” and in both Oliver and
Dunn, the Court stated that judicial inquiry should focus on whether the
search is likely to intrude upon intimate activities.207 Yet, the Dunn Court
still emphasized the physical tie between the curtilage area and the home
201 Alternatively, a constitutional approach could address this problem through a reduced
standard of reasonable suspicion (rather than probable cause) coupled with warrant substitutes to
constrain police behavior. Slobogin notes that in Kyllo, the fact that “‘all details are intimate
details’ . . . does not necessarily dictate that probable cause is needed to use devices that detect
only heat waves and do not reveal their source.” SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 74–75. Intimate
association gives the proportionality principle an important reference point for determining the
intrusiveness of a search. This reference point is perhaps most useful in the context of thermal
scans and other technological searches that only reveal physical attributes of a home.
202 See United States v. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). The curtilage doctrine derives
from English common law extending equivalent protection to houses and outbuildings under the
law of burglary. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225 (“[T]he capital house
protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage or homestall.”).
203 See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that
backyard with “neatly mowed lawn and garden arrangements” is “clearly demarked as a
continuation of the home itself”); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993 (4th Cir. 1981)
(holding that a flower patch bordering mowed lawn 150 feet from a house is not per se outside the
protected curtilage); Coffin v. Brandau, No. 07-cv-835, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64952, at *17–18
(M.D. Fla. July 31, 2008) (attached garage).
204 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
205 See id. Assuming the analysis narrowly targets the property immediately surrounding the
home, proximity to the house may indirectly implicate intimate association.
206 Commentators have also criticized curtilage doctrine for affording greater protection to
rural residents than to urban or suburban dwellers. See Brendan Peters, Note, Fourth Amendment
Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line Rule, 56 STAN. L. REV. 943, 976–79 (2004); see also Carrie
Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban and
Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 297, 311–19 (2005) (“Factors like proximity
to the home or the existence of a fence make sense only in a relatively rural area.”).
207 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)); see
also Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300–01.
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and accorded substantial weight to property-oriented factors and indicia of
publicity.208 While some subsequent federal and state cases have weighed
intimate activity in the residents’ use of the area,209 others have based their
rulings primarily on whether the area was enclosed or within the home’s
“mow lines.”210 A few state courts have categorically extended protection
to open fields via state constitutional protection for possessions,211
reinterpretation of reasonable expectations of privacy,212 and the presence
of “No Trespassing” signs.213
A substantive model of residential privacy calls into question the
focus on physical property and the inconsistent judicial attention to
intimate association and domestic life in curtilage cases. In a postindustrial
society, the outer yard and outbuildings are often places of attenuated
privacy interests, particularly with respect to intimate association and
domestic life. For example, a physical search of shrubbery at the yard’s
periphery, vegetable gardens, or even a garage attached to a home is
unlikely to cause objective harm to intimate association or even create the
highest levels of perceived intrusion upon privacy expectations. These
searches are also unlikely to expose details of interactions, disrupt
relational spaces, chill socialization, or otherwise strike at the heart of
domestic life. In contrast, searches of decks, outdoor dining areas,
narrowly circumscribed areas directly surrounding the home, and other
outdoor locations commonly used for socialization are more likely to
disrupt or chill intimate association and domestic life—a fact that argues
against the categorical exclusion of curtilage from Fourth Amendment
208

Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301–02.
See, e.g., Simko v. Town of Highlands, 276 Fed. App’x 39, 41 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding
that the presence of an overflowing dog “‘poop pit’ strongly suggests that the area surrounding
the shed would be unattractive to private home activities”).
210 See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 875 F. Supp. 108, 119 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Dunn
factors but basing decision on the fact that officers found marijuana plants on a “groomed area”
of the lawn despite the area’s lack of enclosure or use in domestic life); State v. Bayless, No. 92CA-527, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6280, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1992) (holding that seizure
of marijuana plants on the mowed lawn between the house and garden violated rights in the
protected curtilage); State v. Townsend, 412 S.E.2d 477, 479 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that hog
house outside the mowed area of lawn was not within curtilage); see also Peters, supra note 206,
at 965–73 (discussing the significance courts have attributed to “mow lines”); Rowan Themer,
Comment, A Man’s Barn Is Not His Castle: Warrantless Searches of Structures Under the “Open
Fields Doctrine,” 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 139, 145–48 (2008) (reviewing state and federal cases
determining whether a search occurred in open fields or protected curtilage).
211 See Falkner v. State, 98 So. 691, 692 (Miss. 1924) (holding that the state constitution
protects areas with no buildings as “possessions”).
212 See State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988, 994 (Vt. 1991) (holding that an owner of an open
field has a reasonable expectation of privacy where fences or signs reasonably indicate that
strangers are not welcome).
213 See State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75–76 (Mont. 1995) (interpreting the state constitution
to mean that persons may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of land beyond the
curtilage if they place fences, “No Trespassing” signs, or other indications that entry is
forbidden); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1330, 1338 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that open fields
may fall within curtilage where landowners place fences, post “No Trespassing” signs, or
otherwise indicate that entry is not permitted).
209
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protection.
Beginning with the most conservative option for reform, one way to
reorient Fourth Amendment residential protection toward substantive
privacy is to consistently and explicitly accord predominant weight to the
third Dunn factor, the nature of the area’s use. The focus of this inquiry
should be whether an area is categorically likely to be used for domestic
life (e.g., living, interacting, and socializing) as opposed to, for example,
storage of household equipment or open space. This is a practical revision,
not a theoretical departure from key Court precedents, except to the extent
that I propose weighting this factor even more strongly than most
precedents suggest. Another alternative, more responsive to relational
intrusion but perhaps less so to certain nonrelational privacy interests, is to
make the third Dunn factor, the nature of the area’s use, the exclusive
inquiry. This approach would employ other factors, such as proximity to
the house, only to the extent that they inform the analysis of use and
whether a search intrudes upon intimate association.214 To provide
guidance to law enforcement, these reforms would utilize ex ante,
categorical analysis of whether various areas are likely settings for intimate
association.
Proposals for reorienting the Dunn test more tightly around the nature
of the area’s use are feasible, but they raise the concern of too much
unregulated search. An option that addresses this problem is to pair a
modified version of the Dunn test focused on the nature of the area’s use
with a more flexible, fine-grained approach to reasonableness balancing.
Courts could apply reasonableness balancing in curtilage cases under a less
strict standard than probable cause based on the strength of the underlying
associational and other privacy interests. This approach is not entirely
novel in residential search and seizure cases. A handful of cases from state
and federal courts have suggested, indirectly or in dicta, that reasonable
suspicion may suffice in some instances of warrantless curtilage search.215
In the scholarly literature, Slobogin has argued persuasively for a
proportionality principle of reasonableness that weighs the strength of the
justification for the search against the level of intrusiveness to enable
multiple tiers of reasonableness, including standards lower than probable
cause.216 He grounds this proposal in the precedent of Terry v. Ohio, which

214 To better account for nonrelational harms in this scenario, a privacy-focused
reasonableness inquiry into the search’s scope, temporal period, character, and degree of
intrusiveness could accompany the “nature of the use” factor.
215 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 11, at 242 n.108 (compiling cases, including curtilage cases,
allowing warrantless searches based on less than probable cause).
216 See id. at 30 (arguing that the proportionality approach responds to the “intuition,
reflected throughout our jurisprudence, that the government’s burden should vary depending on
the effect of its actions on the individual”). He identifies two standards lower than probable
cause: reasonable suspicion and relevance. He defines reasonable suspicion as thirty percent
certainty that criminal activity is occurring and relevance as five percent certainty that criminal
activity is occurring. See id. at 38–39.
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applied the lower standard of reasonable suspicion to a stop-and-frisk
search.217
As applied to curtilage, a proportional or flexible approach to
reasonableness balancing would weigh the state’s justification versus the ex
ante, categorical likelihood of substantive privacy impact from police
conduct, with the probable intrusion on intimate association a critical
factor. For example, the circumscribed area directly surrounding the house,
decks, patios, and comparable outdoor spaces could retain traditional
probable cause protection based on the likely impact of such searches on
intimate association and domestic life. Areas of curtilage less likely to be
implicated in intimate life, such as storage outbuildings, garages, and
garbage within the curtilage could be subject to a reduced standard of
reasonable suspicion.218 Spaces that are unlikely to implicate substantive
privacy or intimate association interests, such as outlying gardens or dog
houses, could be subject to a low standard such as relevance or excluded
altogether from Fourth Amendment protection.219
This description is a preliminary sketch of the contours of a revised
curtilage doctrine; development of curtilage subtypes and accompanying
standards of protection will proceed best over time and in the context of
judicial precedent. In certain cases, a reasonableness balancing approach
will entail at least initial uncertainty as to the applicable standard for
intermediate or mixed-use areas. In light of the exclusionary rule, police
may opt for caution in ambiguous cases and secure traditional warrant
protection (a process that can often be accomplished expeditiously). This
is not a bad result. Notably, similar uncertainty exists in the present
doctrine, particularly as it is implemented by the lower courts: there is
currently significant ambiguity for law enforcement as to whether areas are
protected curtilage or unprotected open fields.
Although the proposals discussed in this section may appear to
radically revise the law, in fact the case law reveals increasing judicial
ambivalence toward the curtilage doctrine. For example, there is limited
protection for arrest within the curtilage; thresholds of homes are
217

Id. at 30.
See id. at 108–15 (referencing empirical study of levels of perceived intrusiveness).
219 Slobogin proposes that search and seizure doctrine encompass all government action that
constitutes a search for evidence, including countless areas now excluded, and that warrants or
warrant substitutes apply in all cases absent exigency. See id. at 45–47. In the residential search
context, this Article’s depiction of the inefficiency and intransigence of the iconic home may
suggest less dramatic reform. Retaining some form of the Dunn test but enabling some searchers
with less than probable cause is a more incremental, and thus more palatable, reform.
Categorically excluding some government action on curtilage as a non-search based on attenuated
relational and other privacy interests may allow more efficient sifting and use of judicial
resources. Similarly, requiring a warrant or warrant substitute for all curtilage searches may not
be cost effective. From the perspective of resource conservation, the Supreme Court should not
foreclose the possibility that some instances of residential search will qualify as searches and
meet a proportional balancing test, perhaps under the lowest relevance standard, but do not
require ex ante review in the form of a warrant substitute.
218
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considered public places for the purpose of arrest.220 Courts do not appear
hesitant to hold that outdoor areas are open fields rather than protected
curtilage, and following California v. Ciraolo, the Fourth Amendment no
longer protects curtilage from aerial surveillance.221 An increasing number
of circuits have opted to review curtilage determinations de novo rather
than apply the clear error standard.222 The narrowing of curtilage
protection and the suggestion in a handful of cases that less than probable
cause may be acceptable in curtilage searches hints that some of the
reforms described in this section may be quietly beginning.223
3.

The Home as a Proxy: Interior Physical Searches

The physical home has doctrinal value in selective contexts as a proxy
for substantive privacy and privacy of intimate association. Homes are
important to privacy and personhood not because homes symbolize
intimate ties but because they so frequently shelter them. The home serves
as the “stage” for household life and a variety of social relationships.224 An
array of interpersonal processes takes place in the home including “social
and cultural norms and rules, affective, emotional, and evaluative bonds,
and cultural rituals and practices.”225 Psychological and sociological
studies converge on interpersonal relationships as the reason for the
significance that people attribute to their homes.226 Fourth Amendment
protection should derive from the parameters of the physical home only
where they are, as a categorical matter, a reasonably accurate proxy for
substantive interests.
Physical searches that intrude on interior residential living spaces, or
the “seat of family life,” entail a high risk of substantive privacy harm.227

220

See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976).
See 476 U.S. 207, 210 (1986).
222 See Jake Linford, Comment, The Right Ones for the Job: Divining the Correct Standard
of Review for Curtilage Determinations in the Aftermath of Ornelas v. United States, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 885, 886–87 (2008).
223 See supra note 215.
224 See Irwin Altman, Toward a Transactional Perspective: A Personal Journey, in
ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR STUDIES: EMERGENCE OF INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS 225, 240
(Irwin Altman & Kathleen Christensen eds., 1990) (“[I]mportant human relationships occur in
homes, including intimate social bonds and all manner of family relationships.”); see also
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 117, at 121–24 (“[A] home is much
more than a shelter; it is a world in which a person can create a material environment that
embodies what he or she considers significant.”); MCCRACKEN, supra note 182, at 35 (observing
that the home and its unique objects have “the effect of deeply personalizing the present
circumstances”).
225 Werner et al., supra note 113, at 1, 3.
226 See CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & ROCHBERG-HALTON, supra note 117, at 86 (reporting that 82
percent of people listed an object as among their most valued because it reminded them of a close
relative); MCCRACKEN, supra note 182, at 35–46 (noting role in domestic life of “objects [that]
are intended to recall the presence of family and friendship relationships, personal achievements,
family events, ritual passages, and community associations”).
227 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961).
221
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People perceive searches of residential interiors, particularly bedrooms, as
more intrusive than other forms of residential search.228 This finding is
hardly surprising. Extensive physical searches of home interiors inflict
objective harm by engendering fear, suspicion, and blame as government
officers invade living spaces and frequently damage possessions.
Cohabitants may feel that the suspect has brought this invasion upon them,
and the criminal investigation is likely to raise questions or suspicions
about the suspect’s character and behavior, even if the suspect is innocent.
Interior or extensive residential searches also inflict harm by
interrupting domestic life. Search activity halts the conversations,
interactions, and domestic activities that are the foundation of interpersonal
relationships and does so most severely when the search is prolonged or
repetitious. Physical searches for contraband or evidence can also be quite
destructive of living spaces. These searches not only disturb the suspect
and any cohabitants but also disrupt (and even destroy) core living areas.
The disruption of relational spaces in the home and the potential exposure
of private items to social intimates create a high risk of privacy harm.229
Admittedly, these dynamics may occur in curtilage and other less intrusive
residential searches, but they are typically less severe.230
The likelihood of harm to domestic life and intimate association
merits the retention of traditional probable cause and warrant protection for
physical searches of home interiors. By home interior, I mean the rooms
inside the house rather than attached sheds or garages. The strong privacy
and relational interest in such spaces may also counsel removing some of
the established exceptions that apply to physical searches of home interiors.
For example, an analytical focus on substantive privacy and relational harm
suggests eliminating or restricting exceptions based on third-party,
cohabitants’ consent to residential search of home interiors.231 As with the
228

See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.
Contrary to popular intuition, the fact that police see or handle personal items is a lesser
consequence of house search. Police are generally strangers, and our self-presentation and
interpersonal concerns before them are highly attenuated. If the concern is that police will
discuss private information or embarrassing activities not the subject of the crime with other
community members, an internal rule prohibiting disclosure to a community member or tort
liability for any such disclosure can address this problem. For a discussion of the problem of use
of private information discovered in criminal search, see Krent, supra note 150, at 51 (arguing
that seized property should be subject to “use restrictions . . . confining the governmental
authorities to uses consistent with the [Fourth] Amendment’s reasonableness requirement”).
230 Another example of a doctrine that promotes interpersonal conflict within the home is
third-party consent, which enables a third party with common authority to consent to search. See
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). In recent scholarship, Thomas Crocker has
argued persuasively that this doctrine forces the suspect to assume the risk of interpersonal
sharing. See Crocker, supra note 56, at 48–49.
231 Traditionally, third-party consent cases have focused on a cohabitant’s apparent authority
to consent to police trespass and search rather than on substantive privacy and relational harm. In
a substantive privacy framework with intimate association as a key concern, it is clear that
consent does not obviate the risk of relational harm from the search with respect to the defendant
and other cohabitants or visitors. Also, the assumption in the literature is that a cohabitant who
consents has signaled the end of the relationship. The evidence belies this assumption and
229
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other reforms I discuss, the protection of privacy in home interiors via
probable cause and warrants for physical search should be ex ante and
categorical. This example of physical searches of interior living spaces
illustrates how substantive privacy and intimate association can yield clear
rules to guide police action. As a result, a home interior search will on
occasion receive robust protection despite the fact that the search does not
harm substantive privacy and intimate association interests of the specific
defendant and cohabitants. On balance, the benefits of providing guidance
to law enforcement outweigh these costs.
Proponents of strong privacy protection may be reluctant to
distinguish physical (or comparably intrusive technological) searches of
home interiors from less intrusive residential searches. Scholars have
argued that broadly protecting property affords stronger privacy protection
than the Katz reasonable expectations test.232 Others claim that if
protection of intimate life is a vital interest, then it deserves the most
stringent and precautionary form of privacy protection. By this reasoning,
the categorical protection of the home and its environs from all forms of
government intrusion enables intimate relations to develop free from
government interference.233 This approach, however, resurrects housing
exceptionalism with all of its attendant costs to doctrinal efficiency and law
enforcement. Requiring probable cause and warrant protection for every
context of residential search (a standard higher than the Supreme Court’s
current approach) would hinder criminal law enforcement, undermine
public support for privacy protection, and increase pressure on the judiciary
to carve exceptions from residential search protection. Consequently, the
approach I advocate tailors protection more narrowly to intimate life.
V
REVISING THE THEORY OF THE INVIOLATE HOME: OBJECTIONS AND
seriously calls into question whether an ex ante, categorical approach to home interior search
should recognize third-party consent. In light of the evidence that many third-party consenters do
not understand that they are consenting, that they are free to withdraw consent, or the
ramifications of their consent, there is a significant likelihood that consent will damage a viable
relationship between the defendant and consenting cohabitant. See, e.g., Dorothy K. Kagehiro et
al., Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to Warrantless Police Searches, 18 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 38, 46–47 (2006) (finding significant actor (third party) and observer (court)
differences in perceptions of the perceived voluntariness of consent and the ramifications of legal
consent). In addition, a substantive approach, by redirecting the inquiry to privacy harm, raises
the question of whether the type of residential search, and its invasiveness, should matter to thirdparty consent cases.
232 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349,
1364 (2004) (“Instead of protecting individual expectations of privacy directly, courts might best
protect privacy in public life indirectly by identifying and protecting those features of our society,
including those features of public space, that allow anonymity and other privacy-related interests
to exist in sufficient measure.”); see also Bascuas, supra note 23, at 579, 626–28 (advocating that
Fourth Amendment doctrine abandon the direct protection of privacy and instead protect
property, broadly and pragmatically defined).
233 I thank Tommy Crocker for his comments on this point.
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CONSIDERATIONS
Removing residential privacy rights protection from its hallowed and
long-standing position of privilege represents an upheaval of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. This Part responds to concerns and objections to
revising the protection of privacy rights in the home. Specifically, I
consider the security interest in the Fourth Amendment, the problem of
repeat search, and social norms of privacy.
A. Security and Other Privacy Interests
One objection to my account is that criminal search protection is not
about privacy, relational or otherwise, but about the right to security or
other interests.234 In Minnesota v. Carter, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote
that the protection the home receives under the Fourth Amendment has
“acquired over time a power and an independent significance justifying a
more general assurance of personal security in one’s home, an assurance
which has become part of our constitutional tradition.”235 Jed Rubenfeld
has described this concept as the right to be let alone from the progressively
normalizing force of the government.236 He has advocated replacing the
current doctrinal focus on privacy with a reinvigorated notion of security.237
To the extent that housing exceptionalism is based on psychological
and political rationales that falter upon closer examination, a new
foundation for protection is necessary. The conceptualization of the Fourth
Amendment security interest, however, does not presently offer a
sufficiently firm and articulated ground. First, the interest in security is
quite vague. It is not clear how it differs from the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence or the scholarship on privacy. Second, security presumably
dovetails to some degree with the principle of intimate association. A
principal impetus of our desire for security is to enable interpersonal
sharing and social life.238 Revising housing exceptionalism promotes
security, and other liberties, by refocusing the Fourth Amendment on the
substantive interests at stake in residential search. With respect to interests
other than security, I acknowledge that there may be reasons for affording
protection to homes other than the rationales explored in this Article.
When autonomy or other privacy interests are at issue, however, most of
the proposals in this Article can accommodate those interests.
B. Repeat Searches and Ubiquitous Monitoring
One concern of more narrowly targeting residential privacy protection

234 Commentators have noted “the difficulties in predicating constitutional protection on
anything so abstract and manipulable as privacy.” Bascuas, supra note 23, at 580.
235 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 100 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236 See Rubenfeld, supra note 127, at 784.
237 See Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 161.
238 See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483–84 (1968).
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is that citizens may be subject to repeat searches or widespread monitoring.
This Article has primarily contemplated discrete instances of search.
Indisputably, a search that does not extensively interfere with substantive
privacy or intimate association may eventually do so if it is repetitious. For
example, a one-time or occasional inspection of certain kinds of curtilage
poses limited substantive harm to interpersonal life; repeat inspections
occurring over an extended period are a different matter.239 Harm occurs
because of the cumulative impact of the privacy invasion, as well as the
experience of prolonged loss of control.
This danger is especially pervasive in technological searches because
of the capacity for continuous and widespread surveillance. There are a
variety of options to address this problem. Search warrants or searchwarrant substitutes provide an important measure of protection against
repeat searches and ubiquitous surveillance. Statutes and internal police
rules can also address repeat searches and prevent the development of a
“police state.”
With respect to physical searches of curtilage and other residential
spaces, internal checks on repeat searches are available. Law enforcement
has limited resources.240 Police lack the time and resources necessary to
repeatedly search a large number of geographically dispersed residences (as
opposed to central streets and thoroughfares). This constrains, but does not
eliminate, the repeat-search problem. As with technology, legal constraints
and remedies can address repeat searches. A revised Fourth Amendment
approach to residential search could, for example, extend heightened
protection to repeat searches by requiring a warrant or higher standard of
cause following the initial search. Statutes, internal rules, and a cause of
action against police for search action that rises to the level of harassment
are other possible sources of redress.241
C. Social Norms of Privacy
If people believe homes should be inviolate, then shouldn’t the Fourth
Amendment reflect this belief? In other words, has my account neglected
the proper role of subjective perceptions and social norms in defining
privacy law? My response to this concern is twofold. First, the physical
home is an imperfect proxy for what people find most meaningful about
domestic spaces. The strongest focus of public consternation about
239 Cf. Tracey Maclin, Police Interrogation During Traffic Stops: More Questions Than
Answers, 31 CHAMPION 34, 34–36 (2007) (describing precedents allowing police to stop and
question motorists about subjects unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop).
240 See, e.g., Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1199 (2001) (describing limited police resources as one justification for
eschewing strong prohibitions on deception in interrogation).
241 For members of protected classes, state prohibitions against discrimination and the
availability of federal Section 1983 actions to redress discrimination and other constitutional
violations may also protect against repeat search that rises to the level of discrimination or
harassment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 14141 (2006).
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residential privacy is presumably on incursions that reveal intimate
associations and activities.242 The available empirical evidence does not
test this directly, but Slobogin and Schumacher’s findings are broadly
consistent with the notion that residential searches that expose, harm, or
even symbolize intimate association, such as searches of bedrooms or home
interiors, are considered the most intrusive.243
Second, the Katz test requires the Court to consider subjective
expectations of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”244 An analysis focused exclusively on majoritarian views
founders on the circularity between law and privacy norms and
disadvantages minority interests and emerging technologies. Objective
reasonableness must also be a factor. The limited research to date suggests
modest effects from discrete physical invasions of spaces, particularly
when relational harm is not at issue, and less harm from the exposure of
possessions or embarrassing items to law enforcement than to intimates.245
There is not a strong basis in law or other evidence to conclude that
housing exceptionalism meaningfully safeguards against privacy harm.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment has disproportionately protected residential
privacy rights on the basis of property-law concepts and the rhetoric of the
inviolate physical home. Housing exceptionalism has decreased the
coherence and efficiency of the Fourth Amendment and derailed doctrine
from the goal of protecting citizens from substantive privacy harm.
Contrary to the current understanding of Fourth Amendment doctrine, the
privileging of the home within criminal search is not a principled response
to psychological and political exigency or original intent. I advocate
replacing housing exceptionalism and formalist property approaches with a
strong and consistent doctrinal focus on harm to substantive privacy and
intimate association.
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See ALTMAN, supra note 103, at 22 (“Privacy is usually an interpersonal event . . . .”).
See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 16, at 738–39 tbl.1.
244 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
245 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. Prioritizing intimate association over
protection of the physical home is also consistent with the psychology literature conceptualizing
privacy as interaction management. See Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 91, at 33.
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